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INTRODUCTION
For wrongly convicted felons, improved DNA testing has increasingly
provided the means by which innocence is proved and freedom from
incarceration secured. A recent study of 328 criminal cases and subsequent
exonerations over the past fifteen years found that DNA evidence contributed
to 145 of those exonerations, and, moreover, that DNA evidence helped free
inmates in 88 percent of the rape cases in the study.' Former Governor Ryan of
Illinois made national headlines when he commuted the death penalty sentences
of 167 inmates because new evidence revealed that many on death row were
2innocent of the crimes for which they were convicted. DNA testing has
applicability well beyond criminal law, however. Improved genetic testing3 is
changing how we define "traditional" families. While res judicata and estoppel
principles have long been used to preserve the unitary, nuclear family, some
states are moving away from these doctrines in favor of biological paternal
certainty.4 Thus, if a man is not the biological father of a child-and was either
uncertain or unaware of this biological fact-he may petition to "disestablish"
Assistant Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Many thanks to David Favre,
Theresa Glennon, Jane Murphy, and Nancy Knauer for their thoughtful suggestions.
1. Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at
A15.
2. See, e.g., CBS News, Ryan Clearing Illinois Death Row tJan. 11, 2003), at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/30/national/main534639.shtml.
3. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 555-56 (2000) (explaining that by the 1980s, DNA or "genetic
marker" testing provided probabilities of paternity greater than 99%); see also D. KELLY WEISBERG &
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAw 510 (2d ed. 2002) (describing both human leukocyte
antigen (HLA) and modem genetic marker testing and their respective accuracy in establishing
percentage probability of biological paternity).
4. See infra Part IV.
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patemity. 5 These disestablishment petitions represent the emergence of a new
family law phenomenon-paternity fraud.6
Many men who have either been adjudicated fathers or who have
voluntarily acknowledged their paternal legal status7 are now challenging the
propriety of those legal determinations because genetic testing subsequently
revealed their nonpaternity. 8 A grassroots movement is underway to exonerate
these innocent fathers from the "bonds of parentage." 9  Likening newly
discovered evidence of nonpaternity to DNA testing that exonerates a felon, the
U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud website includes the motto, "If the Genes
don't fit, you must acquit."' 0
Responding to growing concerns from men who no longer wish to pay
child support for their nonbiological children, a growing number of states, by
case or statute, permit men to disestablish paternity if they successfully offer
5. Id.
6. Paternity fraud is now a part of the American vernacular, used by both lawmakers and
laypersons alike to describe the situation in which a man who believes he is the biological father of a
child and therefore functions as a parent, later learns that he has no biological connection to the child
and seeks to disestablish paternity because of alleged "fraud." A quick Internet search reveals a
multitude of websites devoted to the issue of paternity fraud, and numerous newspaper and magazine
articles have been written about this growing phenomenon, several of which are cited herein.
As used in this paper, paternity fraud refers to actions to disestablish paternity by an alleged
nonbiological father. This article does not address cases in which paternity fraud has been an alleged
cause of action in an interspousal tort case. See, e.g., Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475 (Neb. 2002)
(rejecting claims of fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by a man against his
ex-wife based on her misrepresentation that he was child's biological father).
7. See infra note 96 and accompanying text regarding voluntary acknowledgments of paternity.
8. In Pennsylvania, two years after divorcing his wife, Gerald Miscovich became suspicious that
his four-year-old son was not his biological child and took the child for genetic testing. Miscovich v.
Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726, 727 (1997). The testing confirmed Gerald's suspicion and he subsequently
petitioned the court to admit the DNA testing to disestablish his paternity and to terminate his child
support obligation. Id. Relying upon the marital presumption of paternity, the court denied his request.
Id. at 732. Moreover, the court characterized his attempts to disestablish paternity as "disgusting." The
court wrote:
We recognize that there is something disgusting about a husband who, moved by bitterness
toward his wife, suddenly questions the legitimacy of her child whom he had been accepting
and recognizing as his own .... Where the husband has accepted his wife's child and held it
out as his own over a period of time, he is estopped from denying paternity.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 355 (1962)). Miscovich is a
paternity fraud legislation activist. But see infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text concerning a
recent Pennsylvania decision that embraced the doctrine of paternity fraud and permitted an ex-husband
to disestablish his paternity.
9. See, e.g., U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, at http://www.patemityfraud.com (last visited
October 29, 2004). Camell Smith, the founder of the organization and website, attempted several times
to vacate his paternity judgment and support obligation in the State of Georgia. Men's News Daily
Newswire, Paternity Fraud Legislation Sweeps the Nation (Apr. 30, 2003), at
http://mensnewsdaily.com/archive/newswire/nw03/rnnd/newswire043003.htm. He became a lobbyist
for paternity fraud reform and after Georgia recently passed its paternity fraud bill, Mr. Smith returned
to court and had his child support obligation vacated. Id. Mr. Smith describes himself and his efforts as
follows: "Carnell Smith is a married Christian, paternity fraud victim, DNA poster boy, non-custodial
dad and self-avowed advocate for legislative reform to help children know their biological father and
restore constitutional rights to fraud victims. I am looking for victims and supporters-worldwide!"
Camell's Case, at http://www.man4justice.com/0418cas.htm (last visited October 29, 2004).
10. U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, at http://www.patemityfraud.com (last visited October
29, 2004).
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scientific proof-i.e., DNA test results-that demonstrate a genetic
impossibility of paternity." The issue of paternity disestablishment has
become a cause crlrbre for men who have unsuccessfully petitioned to
disestablish their paternity subsequent to genetic testing which disproved their
biological fatherhood. For instance, Patrick McCarthy learned after his divorce
that his fourteen-year-old daughter was not biologically his. Although he tried
to terminate his paternity and child support obligation, he was unsuccessful.
1 2
He has instead become a leading activist in the battle for "paternity fraud
reform" and has founded New Jersey Citizens Against Paternity Fraud, an
organization that recently paid $50,000 for nine billboards along highways that
show a pregnant woman and read "Is It Yours? If Not, You Still Have to
Pay!'
13
Nonbiological fathers like McCarthy compare their nonpaternity with a
wrongful criminal conviction. As Mary Anderlik and Mark Rothstein have
recently observed, "[T]hose within the fathers' rights movement... tend to
view family law through the lens of criminal law .... It is common to find the
issue framed as one of justice or fairness, in the sense that evidence admissible
to 'convict' should also be available to 'exonerate." '" 4 But can-and should-
family law be equated with criminal law? A wrongly convicted man should be
exonerated: he has been the victim of "the system." The analogy to a
"wrongly" identified father is much more difficult to make: once a man has
assumed all of the functions and responsibilities of parenthood, he is-in a very
meaningful way-the child's father. A man who learns years after his child's
birth that he has no biological connection to his child'5 may feel wrongly
adjudicated and tricked by the mother of the child-a very natural reaction. He
may further believe that he has been the victim of a federal and state system
that forces mothers to name their baby's father in order to qualify for certain
financial benefits.' 6 I do not mean to ignore the emotional devastation this
nonbiological father experiences after learning he is not the genetic father of his
child. To simply disestablish paternity, however, ignores the crucial difference
11. See, e.g., MD. FAMILY § 5-1038 (1995) (authorizing the set aside of a paternity judgment if
blood or genetic testing excludes as the biological father the individual names as the father in the
judgment); OHIO STAT. §§ 3119.961 - 3119.962 (2002) (permitting the disestablishment of paternity
based upon blood or genetic tests which exclude biological paternity). See infra Section IV.B for an
analysis of these and other paternity fraud statutes.
12. Kathy Boccella, Men Seek 'Paternity Fraud' Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 23, 2002, at Al.
13. Id.
14. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the
Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215,220 (2001).
15. Throughout this Article, I use the pronoun "his" in reference to the child who is legally, yet not
biologically, that of the father. I have purposefully chosen to identify the child as "his child" because in
many of the cases discussed herein, the father had established a functional parent-child relationship.
Moreover, even in those cases in which a significant emotional relationship has not been established, a
significant legal relationship has been established, which may be just as important to the child.
16. See infra Section L.A discussing the link between the child support enforcement process and
erroneous paternity establishment.
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between the criminal and family law contexts: the presence and best interests of
a child.
At the outset, it is necessary to explore the very term, "paternity fraud."
Though used by courts, legislatures, newspersons, and others, at its core the
term embraces an often-incorrect assumption: a devious and fraudulent act by
the child's mother. In paternity fraud cases, the legal father typically portrays
the mother as a scheming Jezebel who set out to trick, dupe, and deceive the
man she falsely named as the child's father. And many people reading articles
about "duped dads" feel sympathy for a man who was so wronged. But the
scheming Jezebel scenario, as the case discussions herein will show, is not
always true. A pregnant woman having an extramarital affair, for instance,
may not know which man is the biological father. If her marriage is back on
track, she may not wish to rock the boat and damage her family further by
revealing the affair. In the paternity context, some women may not know
which man is the biological father of their child but must name a man in order
to qualify for governmental benefits. 17 The issue is much more complicated
than a bad girl, good guy scenario.
Some women have purposely lied to their husbands or boyfriends. But the
focus on a conniving woman who victimizes a man is misplaced. Paternity
fraud claims, at their most base and essential level, involve a child or children,
and these claims do children a great disservice. Paternity fraud statutes-
predicated on the enhanced availability and reliability of genetic testingl -are
being used to destroy established, and often times functional, parent-child
relationships. Simply because we have the means to determine biological
parentage with greater certainty does not mean that it is in the best interests of
children to do so.' 9 Courts and legislatures express disagreement concerning
what exactly is in a child's best interests: preservation of an existing parent-
child relationship or severing that relationship in hopes of establishing the
actual biological father as the legal father. This Article presumes that it is in
the child's best interests to hold legal fathers responsible. As Professor
Elizabeth Bartholet has recently written, "We should feel free to hold men
responsible regardless of whether they were in some way misled into
parenthood by women. Children should not be penalized in a way that denies
17. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
18. As discussed above, paternity can be established with biological certainty, based on improved
blood and genetic testing. Moreover, testing can be easily accomplished-now even home testing kits
are available-and the tests are relatively inexpensive. See, e.g., Mary R. Anderlik, Assessing the
Quality of DNA-Based Parentake Testing: Findings From a Survey of Laboratories, 43 JURIMETRICS J.
291 (2003) (discussing the availability of home testing and other methods of parentage testing in
assessing the need for parentage testing reform that better regulates both laboratory practices and who
and when parties may undergo parentage testing).
19. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 323,
324 (2004) ("Once a child-parent relationship has been created, we should not let it be destroyed simply
because there is no DNA match. Parenting, once undertaken, is or should be a lifetime responsibility.").
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them fundamental nurturing and support because of the actions of their
mothers. 2 °
Advances in paternity testing causes us to re-examine the legal and policy
justifications for redefining families. The structure of the American family has
undergone dramatic change in recent years and the numbers of traditional
nuclear families are in decline while single-parent families and stepfamilies are
21growing. In an era in which individuals and couples, heterosexual and
homosexual, are embracing new reproductive technologies to create families,
the "biological connection" often does not assist in establishing legal parentage
for "intended" parents.22 Couples and individuals alike may contract with
23sperm donors, egg donors, and/or gestational surrogates to create families. As
a result, reliance on biology as the sole means by which to determine legal
parentage no longer makes sense.24 Functional parenthood-emphasizing the
daily, routine, and even mundane aspects of everyday parenting-provides a
more realistic approach to defining legal parentage, especially for
nontraditional families. 25
20. Id. at 340.
21. According to U.S. Census Bureau 2000 statistics, married-couple households with children
made up only 24 percent of all households compared with 40 percent in 1970. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE
M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 3 (2001),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf.
22. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act now provides a methodology by which legal parentage
can be established for children born using anonymous sperm or egg donation and/or gestational
surrogates. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 & 8, 9B U.L.A. 354-70 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a
couple who had arranged for the birth of a child through donor insemination and a surrogate mother
were in fact the child's legal parents, despite the absence of any biological connection to the child,
because the child would not have been born "but for the efforts of the intended parents") (quoting
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)).
24. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining
Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 134 (2003) ("Genes should not define fatherhood. This is
wrong for men and wrong for children. Genes define identity, but that link should be separated from the
obligations and rights of parenthood."); Bartholet, supra note 19, at 323
[B]iology has never been all-determinative in defining parentage, whether in nature or under
law .... For as long as law has governed various family matters among humans, it has
looked at biology as only one among a number of factors to be used in deciding how to
allocate parental rights and responsibilities.
Id.
25. Scholars have been addressing the need for expanded definitions of parenthood (i.e., beyond
biology) for two decades. In her seminal 1984 article, Katharine Bartlett argued that courts must look
beyond the traditional exclusivity model of parentage, in light of the decline of the nuclear family.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). Nancy Polikoff has
also argued that legal parenthood premised only upon biology leaves many children with nontraditional
parents out in the cold. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459
(1990); see also Janet Leach Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus Child Rights, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 1227 (1994) (recognizing the need to include nonbiological caretakers within the legal
definition of parent based upon the best interests of the child); Richard Storrow, Parenthood by Pure
Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597
(2002)(arguing that family law jurisprudence must expand beyond traditional notions of marriage and
biology and should embrace functional parenthood).
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In addressing the issue of paternity fraud claims, this Article endeavors to
reconcile two competing theoretical trends in family law: biology versus
functionality. As discussed herein, many courts and scholars embrace
functionality in the context of establishing parental relationships yet place
emphasis on biology in disestablishing parental relationships. While the
differences between seeking to establish a child-parent relationship and
disestablishing such a relationship are noted and discussed, they are
nonetheless synthesized to encourage one family law model, rather than two.
This Article offers readers a fresh perspective not only regarding paternity
fraud claims but modem family law generally, by seeking middle-ground
between the legal foci of biology and functionality. My proposal for resolving
paternity fraud claims involves a balancing between the competing interests of
a legal, yet nonbiological father, and his child.
Specifically, this Article explores the disconnect between two concurrent
legal trends: first, establishing parenthood and parental rights based on
principles of functionality; and second, disestablishing legal parenthood
because of a lack of biological connection between parent and child. In Part I, I
discuss the underlying causes of the paternity fraud phenomenon, including the
influences of enhanced genetic testing and improved child support
enforcement. In Part II, I review the traditional establishment of parentage and
the increasing recognition of legal rights for functional parents. In Part III, I
discuss the disestablishment of paternity, focusing primarily on cases which
rely on principles of res judicata, estoppel, and finality of judgments to
preclude paternity disestablishment and discuss why it has historically been
difficult for men to challenge paternity in a range of contexts. Next, in Part IV,
I review several recent cases and statutes that permit disestablishment of
paternity in "fundamental fairness" to the nonbiological father. Finally, in Part
V, I offer a proposed statute of limitations for paternity fraud actions which
strikes a balance between the best interests of children in preserving intact
father-child relationships while permitting nonbiological fathers a short
window in which to challenge a seemingly unfair paternity establishment. I
conclude that permitting disestablishment of paternity without a reasonable
statute of limitations does not serve the best interests of children and is
damaging to the children involved as well as our society's emerging notions of
family.
[Vol. 16:193
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I. THE PATERNrY FRAUD PHENOMENON
A. How Increased Emphasis on Child Support Enforcement Has Influenced
the Paternity Fraud Debate
Paternity fraud cases arise in several different contexts: 1) husbands
seeking to disestablish paternity at the time of divorce; 2) ex-husbands seeking
to disestablish paternity subsequent to a divorce; and 3) unmarried fathers
seeking to disestablish paternity subsequent to a paternity judgment or legal
26acknowledgment of parentage. The circumstances leading to their respective
paternity establishments are different but their concerns about paternity fraud
are similar: they have no genetic relationship to the child they believed was
their biological offspring and thus they no longer wish to be legally obligated to
pay child support.2 7
Particular to paternity cases, however, is the role of federal and state child
support establishment and enforcement programs. The federal Office of Child
Support Enforcement (OCSE) was established in 1975 as part of an amendment
to the Social Security Act of 1975 28 Under the Act, each state was required to
develop its own child support enforcement program, although the law clearly
envisioned a cooperative effort between states and the federal government and
states receive some federal funding for these programs. Although states have
29discretion to operate their programs, federal law imposes certain requirements
and Congress has passed several laws relating to the federal child support
enforcement program. 30 For example, the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA)
set performance standards for state programs establishing paternity and states
26. There is a large body of scholarship and case law addressing the ability of husbands to
challenge paternity of a child born in wedlock at the time of divorce, i.e., the "marital presumption." In
attempting to refine the focus of this article and avoid the many complicated legal and policy issues
specific to the marital presumption, I have narrowed my analysis to the situations in which a man
challenges his paternity subsequent to a divorce or paternity judgment and do not discuss situations in
which a man challenges paternity during a divorce proceeding. For more information about challenging
the marital presumption of paternity at the time of divorce, see, for example, Glennon, supra note 3
(providing a thorough background of the marital presumption, the competing policy concerns both for
and against continued vitality of the marital presumption, and treatment of the marital presumption in
the Uniform Parentage Act); and Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69 (2000) (examining three state models of the marital presumption).
27. Murray Davis, a "duped dad" from Michigan, is another paternity fraud activist. As he
explained in an interview, "Why should we continue to pursue, incarcerate or hold in financial bondage
an individual who can prove his innocence via irrefutable evidence? Men are just kind of tired of being
victimized." Robert E. Pierre, States Consider Laws Against Paternity Fraud, WASH. POST, Oct. 14,
2002, at A03.
28. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS, 576 (3d ed. 1999).
29. Id.
30. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children (2003) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the International
Society of Family Law North American Conference in Eugene, Oregon) (on file with author).
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must meet a specified "paternity establishment percentage.",31 In addition, the
FSA incorporated additional requirements for state programs, such as income
withholding from noncustodial parents' wages, presumptive support guidelines
for setting child support awards, periodic review and adjustment of some
orders, and the development of statewide automated systems.
32
Within the debate concerning paternity fraud, some men may feel
victimized by a paternity and child support enforcement regime that has as its
core mission the increased collection of child support, much of which is
predicated upon first establishing a paternity order. In fiscal year 2003, the
OCSE reports that preliminary data reveals paternity was established or
acknowledged for more than 1.5 million children.33 As the Maryland Court of
Appeals noted in its decision in Langston v. Riffe-a case in which a
nonbiological father had his paternity disestablished 34-our current system of
paternity and support establishment and enforcement may be flawed. The court
wrote,
In the great majority of these cases, it is the State, on behalf of the
mother, who initiates the proceeding against the putative father ....
[and] through its various agencies, litigates the matter to
conclusion .... [F]athers often may not be present to challenge the
proceeding or to provide a blood or genetic sample.
35
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also discussed the role of
state agencies in establishing paternity 36 and wrote that it "recognize[d] the
anomaly of enforcing the parental obligations of a man who was identified as a
parent only (it seems) because the State insisted that the mother name [a
child's] biological father, where he has now established that he is not that
man."3 7 Further addressing the state's role in paternity establishment, the court
wrote:
Where the State requires an unmarried woman to name her child's
putative father, the department should require that the parties submit to
genetic testing prior to the execution of any acknowledgment of
paternity or child support agreement. To do otherwise places at risk
the well-being of children born out of wedlock whose fathers
31. APPLETON & WEISBERG, supra note 3, at 506-07 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 652(g) (1994 & Supp.
1999)).
32. ELLMAN, supra note 28, at 576n.15.
33. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FACT SHEET FOR
THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (2004), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/opa/factsheets/csefactsheet.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
34. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. Ct. App. 2000).
35. Id. at 409.
36. In Re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (holding that man who had genetic
evidence disproving paternity could not vacate a paternity judgment entered more than five years
earlier).
37. Id. at 499.
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subsequently learn, as modem scientific methods now make possible,
that they have no genetic link to their children.
38
Genetic testing prior to acknowledging paternity should be considered as a
process norm to avoid later challenges to paternity.39 If testing reveals
nonpatemity, the man will exercise his choice to either deny paternity or to
voluntarily accept the legal responsibility of parentage that he could not later
deny.40  However, men who do not undergo genetic testing prior to
acknowledging paternity-because they do not wish to, believe that they are
the biological father without testing, and the like-should not later be able to
deny their paternity because they no longer wish to act as parents. Other
parents cannot choose a date on which they no longer wish to support-
emotionally and financially--their child. Why should these nonbiological yet
functional parents be permitted to vacate their parental obligations?
It is estimated that, in 1999, almost one-third of 280,000 paternity cases
evaluated by the American Association of Blood Banks excluded the individual
tested as the biological father of the child.41 By extension, it is quite plausible
that a significant number of the men who voluntarily acknowledge paternity
during a divorce proceeding, by written document, or who are adjudicated legal
fathers without the benefit of genetic testing are not actually the biological
father of their child. But is disestablishment of paternity, often many years
after entry of a paternity judgment, an appropriate method of redress? Paternity
fraud jurisprudence has at its core the difficulty of balancing competing best
interests: those of the child and the child's nonbiological yet legal father.
Whose rights are paramount? Whose should be paramount? And can we
characterize this issue as one of "genetic innocence"?
B. An Introduction to the Biological Versus Functional Parenthood Debate
As our societal understanding of "family" grows, changes, and moves
away from the traditional, nuclear family, an interesting disconnect has
emerged. As newspaper columnist Ellen Goodman has observed, these
scientific advances force us to ask, "What does make a father? Diapers or
38. Id. at499n.21.
39. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship
in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1066-70 (2003) (proposing
mandatory paternity testing of all children at birth to estop paternity challenges).
40. Carbone and Cahn suggest that if subsequent to genetic testing which reveals lack of biological
paternity a nonbiological father signs a voluntary acknowledgment he may not, under any
circumstances, challenge the acknowledgment. Id.
41. See Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 88 (W. Va. 2002) (Maynard, J., dissenting). In
her article assessing the quality of DNA-based parentage testing, Mary R. Anderlik writes that the
American Association of Blood Banks Annual Report Summary for 2000 reveals an overall exclusion
rate of 27.9% for domestic accredited laboratories. See Anderlik, supra note 18, at 295; PARENTAGE
TESTING STANDARDS COMM., AM. ASS'N OF BLOOD BANKS ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY FOR 2000, at 3
(2001).
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DNA?' , 2 She continues, "[F]amily law seems to be going in two directions at
once. We are giving more recognition to non-biological relationships ....
[a]nd more weight to DNA.A3 In recent years, scholars, judges, and legislators
have begun to recognize the importance of functional parenthood. For
example, several states have permitted nonbiological lesbian coparents to
maintain visitation and custody petitions because of their intent to parent and
44their history of parenting. Similarly, other nonbiological parents such as
stepparents, grandparents, and foster parents have been able to maintain greater
access to the children they have helped to raise.45 Thus, biology is not the sole
criterion for determining parent-child relationships. Moreover, it should not be
the decisive criterion for determining such relationships. As one judge has
noted, "A father-child relationship encompasses more (and greater)
considerations than a determination of whose genes the child carries.
Sociological and psychological components should be considered. The laws
governing adoptions have acknowledged that parentage is comprised of a
totality of factors, the least significant of which is genetics. 46
What determines parentage has been the subject of much scholarship;
whether primacy should be placed on a genetic relationship or a functional one
is the subject of much debate. While there is greater ease in favoring
traditional principles of biological parentage and presumptions of nuclear
families, many scholars are now embracing nontraditional definitions of
parentage and family. 47  It is interesting to note, for example, that both the
American Law Institute (ALI) and the 2002 revised version of the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) recognize the fact that parental status and legal
48parenthood may be established without regard to biological connection.
42. Ellen Goodman, What Makes A Father? BALT. SUN, May 1, 2001, at 11A.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (holding that former nonbiological
lesbian mother could bring action for visitation with child she had helped to raise); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000) (same); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (same).
45. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
46. Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Brown, J., concurring).
47. See. e.g., supra note 25.
48. The ALl Principles include establishment of a legal parent child relationship without regard to
genetic connection in a variety of circumstances. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the UPA also includes presumptions of legal parenthood that are not predicated on biology.
For example, the UPA presumes a man's legal fatherhood if "for the first two years of the child's life, he
resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). In fact, the UPA 2000 had originally
eliminated this presumption but it was put back in with the 2002 amendments. UNEF. PARENTAGE ACT §
204 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002). By including this presumption of paternity, the UPA drafters
make certain that legal parenthood can be established for nonbiological fathers. Moreover, UPA § 204
further states that presumptions may only be rebutted pursuant to the procedures of Article 6, which
allows courts to use estoppel principles to deny requests for genetic testing "in the interests of preserving
a child's ties to the presumed or acknowledged father who openly held himself out as the child's father
regardless of whether he is in fact the genetic father." Id.
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While many courts are confronting the complexity of establishing
parenthood for nonbiological parents and recognizing legal mechanisms for
such establishment, they are similarly being confronted by men with proof of
nonpaternity who are requesting disestablishment of paternity. These two
trends are happening coterminously and demonstrate a nearly schizophrenic
approach to defining legal parenthood. Within the particular context of
paternity fraud, the same disconnect between genetic and functional parenthood
emerges. Despite scientific advances and biological certainty of nonparentage,
several courts have denied petitions to disestablish paternity because of the
effect of that action on the child.49  These courts value the parent-child
relationship as something more than shared DNA and have determined that the
continued parent-child relationship remains in the child's best interests.
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of courts and legislatures have
established procedures whereby a legally established father can disestablish
paternity if he has scientific proof.5° These opinions and statutes suggest that
either 1) the best interest of the child has no place in the parental
disestablishment determination (thereby obviating the need to discuss whether
dismantling an intact parent-child relationship is harmful to the child),5 or 2)
the best interest of the child is knowing her or his biological father. 52 While it
is true that courts do not consider the best interests of the child in initial
paternity determinations, it is wrong to suggest that the best interests of the
child do not matter when disestablishing the legal parentage of a man the child
has always considered her or his father. Moreover, while there are compelling
reasons for a child to know her or his genetic identity, that knowledge does not
mean that it is in the child's best interests to have an intact parent-child
49. E.g., In re Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (because the father had actively
pursued his parental relationship with his nonbiological daughter, he could not seek to disestablish his
paternity more than five years after the entry of a paternity judgment). See infra Section III.B for
detailed discussion of Cheryl and additional cases in which requests to disestablish paternity are
rejected.
50. E.g., Langston v. Rifle, 754 A.2d 389 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (The Maryland Court of Appeals
heard three appeals concerning disestablishment of paternity based upon genetic testing which
conclusively established nonpatemity. The court, adhering to a Maryland statute permitting an action to
disestablish paternity upon a showing of genetic nonpatemity, permitted each plaintiff, including a man
who filed his action for nonpatemity nine years after entry of the paternity judgment, to disestablish his
paternity). See infra Section IV.A for a discussion of Langston and additional cases and statutes
permitting paternity disestablishment.
51. Langston, 754 A.2d at 431-32 (Court specifically stated that the best interests analysis applies
only to matters related to paternity such as custody and visitation but is inapplicable to the paternity
determination itself).
52. E.g., Williams v. Williams, 843 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2003). The Williams court rationalized
that knowledge of genetic identity was in the child's best interests, even though no one knew who the
biological father was and there was nothing to suggest a new parent-child relationship would be formed.
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relationship terminated in the mere hopes of establishing a new one predicated
on biology.
53
In attempting to bring two disparate trends together-functionality versus
biology-this Article seeks to strike a balance between the best interests of the
child, i.e., preservation of an intact parent-child relationship, and the best
interests of the nonbiological father, i.e., disestablishing paternity. Because the
UPA and ALI often use a two-year time frame in which to establish certain
parental presumptions, this Article uses the same two-year window as part of
the mechanism by which to undo parental presumptions, and includes a best
interests of the child component. The two-year window is seemingly arbitrary;
why not use eighteen months or three years? The purpose for which this
Article employs the two-year statute is to bring the jurisprudence of paternity
fraud in line with emerging functionality jurisprudence. By so doing, this
Article endeavors to recognize one holistic family law model and seeks to unite
these disparate trends. Moreover, by adding a best interests of the child
component, long-term, functional parent-child relationships are protected while
only short-term, less involved parent-child relationships are subject to
disestablishment. This, too, comports with the way in which courts are
applying parent by estoppel and de facto parent principles to recognize the
parental rights of nonbiological parents.
Thus, the alleged nonbiological father should have a limited time in which
to challenge his paternity: specifically, either 1) two years from the date on
which a presumption of paternity, as defined by the UPA, 54 applies to create a
legal parental relationship, or 2) two years from the date on which a legal
53. As Professor Dowd argues, "Genes should not be the foundation on which legal fatherhood is
established." Rather, she suggests, genetic ties should create identity rights, for medical, health, and
cultural reasons. Dowd, supra note 24, at 138-39.
54. The Uniform Parentage Act § 204, 9B U.L.A. 14 (2002), provides that:
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
(1) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during
the marriage;
(2) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is bom
within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce.. : ;
(3) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in
apparent compliance with the law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid, and the child is bom during the invalid marriage or within 300 days
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce...;
(4) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in
apparent compliance with the law, whether or not the marriage is or could be declared
invalid, and he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and:
(A) the assertion is in a record filed with [state agency maintaining birth records];
(B) he agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth
certificate; or
(C) he promised in a record to support the child as his own; or
(5) for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the
child and openly held out the child as his own.
(b) A presumption of paternity established under this section may be rebutted only by an
adjudication under [Article] 6.
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paternity judgment is established in the absence of genetic marker or blood
testing and only if it is in the child's best interest. 55 A short time period in
which to challenge paternity largely protects the emotional and financial
attachments children make with their fathers, while still providing duped dads
the opportunity to undo the parent-child relationship before it progresses.
Children are the victims of paternity fraud laws, which put them at risk of being
rendered fatherless. These children need their interests protected more than
nonbiological fathers who had opportunities to challenge their paternity prior to
paternity adjudications. Additionally, this proposal, once adopted, will put men
on notice that if they have any doubts about their relationship to a child, they
should question paternity early on, rather than foster and nurture a parent-child
relationship and years later seek to have it undone.
Finally, critics may respond that some men do not nurture a relationship
with their child and are merely legally adjudicated as fathers and then forced to
pay child support. It is true that some men do not have a significant emotional
bond with the child for whom they have been deemed legally responsible. As a
policy matter and to best protect the most children, however, these men should
be held accountable. Striking the appropriate balance in paternity fraud cases is
not simple; as noted, the man involved has been lied to and will now be
required to maintain a legal and financial obligation to a child who is not
biologically his. In attempting to reconcile family law trends and to protect
children who do have significant emotional attachments to their parents, I argue
that the balance must be struck in favor of the children.
Advocates of paternity fraud laws often argue that the man may not have
any functional or emotional relationship with the child. Most often, those
situations arise from paternity judgments where the legal father has not lived
with the child nor functioned as a father. However, a man who is a defendant
in a paternity action has the legal right to request a genetic test. If the man
forgoes the testing and/or evades the legal process, it is unfair to the child that
he should be able to avail himself of testing and the process years later. By
then, the child has already benefited from the legal and financial aspects of the
relationship, even if the emotional aspects are not involved. And, if for some
reason a default judgment has been entered, my proposal still gives the
nonbiological father two years in which to contest the paternity judgment. A
man who does not challenge his paternity should thus be estopped from seeking
to disestablish paternity after a significant period of time has passed. And, in
the divorce context, a man who has lived with his child, functioned as a father,
and established an emotional bond is every bit as much a parent as a man who
is biologically related to his child. To ignore functional parenting in the
paternity fraud context would cause too great an imbalance in family law
generally.
55. See infra Part V for a detailed analysis of my proposed statute of limitations.
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II. TRADITIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF FUNCTIONAL PARENTHOOD
A. Traditional Bases of Parentage Establishment
Typically, parenthood is established by biology or adoption.56 Thus, it has
been simple to regard the child's birth or adoptive mother as the child's legal
mother.57 Historically, fatherhood was established through marriage: a
legitimate child was "born in lawful wedlock or within a competent time
afterwards.' '58  In modem times, a woman's husband is presumed to be the
legal father of a child she bears during the marriage or within 300 days of the
59termination of the marriage.
In contrast, a child born out of wedlock was historically filius nullius-no
one's son-and had no right to receive support or inheritance from his or her
60parents. Well into the twentieth century, nonmarital children had no right to
inheritance or support from their fathers6' and the gap between the rights of
marital and nonmarital children remained wide. Beginning in the 1960s, the
Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that held that discrimination against
62nonmarital children was unconstitutional. All states now have procedures by
63
which to compel fathers to provide support for their nonmarital children.
56. E.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201, 9B U.LA. 309 (2000).
57. With the advent of reproductive technology, situations now arise whereby the issue of legal
maternity is more difficult to establish. Courts and legislatures are now confronted with conflicts
between birth mothers, egg donor mothers, gestational surrogates, and the like. For example, Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), involved a dispute between the egg donor mother and the
birth/gestational mother. The court concluded that under California's version of the UPA, both women
could assert valid claims of maternity, but the court viewed intent as the deciding factor in determining
parentage. Because the egg donor mother and her husband had contracted with the surrogate to bear a
child that they would raise, the court found the egg donor mother's intent to parent the child more
compelling than the wishes of the surrogate. Id. at 780-82.
The law is playing "catch-up" with these technological advancements and the revised UPA
includes an entire Article concerning gestational agreements and how parenthood should be legally
established pursuant to a validly executed agreement under Article Eight. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
Art. 8, 9B U.L.A. 360-70 (2000).
58. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.1 (2d
ed. West 1988) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 446, 454 (Cooley
4th ed. 1899)).
59. Id. § 4.4.
60. Glennon, supra note 3, at 553.
61. Id.
62. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating
Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341, 346 (2002) (citing Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)) (ruling that Louisiana's Wrongful Death Act violated the Equal
Protection Clause by denying recovery to a nonmarital child for the death of the mother); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (nonmarital child permitted to recover damages for
.father's death under a state workers' compensation law).
63. CLARK, supra note 58, at § 4.4.
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In 1973, the Uniform Parentage Act was promulgated to create equality for
children born in and out of wedlock by introducing various means by which a
man may be established as a child's legal father.64  Once paternity is
established, the legal father has all of the benefits and responsibilities of legal
parenthood. Legal parenthood assures a child of the right to receive financial
support, qualify as a dependent on her parent's health insurance, collect Social
Security benefits, sustain an action for wrongful death, recover under
workmen's compensation, and, in many states, to inherit from her parent.65
Legal parenthood includes many intangible benefits, too, such as the authority
to make medical, educational, religious, and moral decisions on behalf of a
child.66  Once a legal parent-child relationship is established, so, too, is the
right to maintain a relationship with the child even if the child's parents
separate. Divorce and paternity statutes provide fathers with custody and
visitation rights, thereby preserving the father's ability to maintain an
emotional bond with his child.67
As noted above, historically, fatherhood could be established not only by
biology, but through marriage, without any biological connection to the child.
As modem paternity jurisprudence developed, so, too, did legal notions of
fatherhood. Although the legal rights of marital fathers were well entrenched,
several Supreme Court opinions, beginning with Stanley v. Illinois,68 began to
recognize the rights of unmarried biological fathers. Through a series of cases
addressing the legal right of unmarried biological fathers to have notice prior to
the adoption of their biological children by other men, the Court developed the
"biology plus" test, which recognized that biological fathers who have actively
asserted their parental rights must receive notice of the child's mother's intent
to have the child adopted.69 In articulating the "biology plus" test, the Court
64. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory note (1973), 9B U.L.A. 289 (2002).
65. Jacobs, supra note 62, at 346.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Following the death of their mother, Stanley's children were removed
from their home in compliance with an Illinois statute that presumed an unmarried, biological father was
unfit to raise his children. The Court found that Stanley's due process and equal protection rights were
violated and that the state must provide him with an opportunity to establish fitness prior to the
children's removal. Id. at 658.
69. In a series of three opinions, the Court made clear that recognition of legal fatherhood was
dependent upon more than mere biology. In Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the Court held
that a man who had not sought to establish a relationship with his son could not prevent the child's
adoption by the mother's husband, thereby upholding a Georgia adoption statute that required only the
mother's consent to adoption unless the father had taken steps to legitimate his parental relationship. In
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the Court held that a New York adoption statute violated the
petitioner's right to equal protection because it required consent only of the mother prior to the adoption
proceeding. Unlike the father in Quilloin, the father in Caban had lived with his children and, after he
moved out of the home, continued to contribute to their support and to see his children frequently (even
having custody of them briefly). Finally, in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court upheld a
statute which imposed a time limitation for a putative father to establish a relationship with his child and
held that due process does not require notice to a biological father who has not assumed any
responsibility for his child nor manifested any parental function. The Court wrote, "The significance of
2004]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 16:193
made clear that, while biology is a gateway to parenthood, biology alone is
insufficient to protect a biological father's legal rights. It takes more than
biology to be a parent.
B. The Growing Recognition of Functional Parenthood
Most recently, state courts have begun to recognize parental rights of
nonbiological parents, illustrating the growing chasm within family law
jurisprudence. Despite heightened (and I argue, misplaced) emphasis on
biological connection in the paternity fraud context, more courts are
recognizing the rights of functional parents to establish legal relationships with
70 71the children they have parented. For example, stepparents, grandparents,
foster parents, 72 and gay and lesbian coparent 73 have increasingly been
recognized as functional parents entitled to maintain custodial or visitation
relationships with children they have helped to raise. Moreover, advances in
reproductive technology have caused courts to evaluate the legal parenthood of
nonbiological parents who contract with either a surrogate, egg donor, and/or
sperm donor and to make a determination of legal parenthood. Several of these
courts have recognized that the "intended" parent should trump the parent with
a biological connection to the child.74 Significantly, courts are recognizing that
biology is not the only means by which to establish legal parenthood and
the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring." Id. at 262.
For a greater analysis of the development of the biology plus principle, see WEISBERG &
APPLETON, supra note 3, at 526-28. See also Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About
Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993); Murphy, supra note 30, at 9-11.
70. See, e.g., Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing Indiana statute
which permits de facto custodians (in this case, a stepfather) to establish custodial and/or visitation
rights); Miller v. Millet, 478 A.2d 351 (N.J. 1984) (invoking principles of equitable estoppel to uphold
stepfather's duty of child support).
71. See, e.g., Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (finding that visitation, pursuant to the
state's Grandparents Visitation Act, was appropriate and constitutional for grandparents who had
functioned as children's parents for significant periods of time); see also Janet L. Dolgin, The
Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 396-401 (2002)
(reviewing several grandparent visitation cases from New York and California, some of which permit
grandparent visitation).
72. See, e.g., Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (recognizing liberty interest in f3ster
families in preserving relationships with children in their care); see also Kyle C. Velte, Towards
Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented Family, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245,
277-81 (2000-2001) (discussing how Smith can be used by foster parents to maintain an ongoing
relationship with their foster children and may also stand for the proposition that other third parties may
have a similar liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with a child they have helped to raise).
73. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (holding that lesbian coparent was a
de facto parent and probate court properly entered order permitting visitation between lesbian coparent
and child); Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (holding that lesbian coparent was a
psychological parent and could maintain an action for visitation with her nonbiological child).
74. Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (holding that a child's intended parents, not sperm
and egg donors nor gestational surrogates, are the child's legal parents); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776 (holding that egg donor/intended mother should be legal mother rather than gestational
surrogate/birth mother).
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parental rights. Thus, the reliance upon biological connection to disestablish
paternity is seemingly at odds with current efforts to expand the legal definition
of "family" and to recognize the legal rights of persons who are not otherwise
legal parents through biology or adoption.
Before addressing the specific grounds for establishing legal parentage
rights for persons without a biological or adoptive connection with a child, it is
worth noting that these principles are predicated upon a nonbiological parent's
desire to parent. This is in direct contrast with the paternity fraud cases in
which men no longer wish to parent. But the underlying principles of estoppel
are designed to protect the child's best interests, emotionally and financially.
To create a legal dichotomy between establishing parentage and disestablishing
parentage seemingly ignores the child's best interests in the latter situation. If
courts recognize the importance of maintaining parental relationships in other
contexts, why should biology be the determinative factor in disestablishing
parentage? 75
Recent studies indicate that genetic familial connections are less important
than actual parenting. One recent study of adoptive, two-parent biological,
single-mother and stepparent households suggest that genetic connections are
less significant than previously believed. The authors found only limited
support for the hypothesis that biological ties with two parents would
significantly advantage children. 76  Another recent study found positive
outcomes for nongenetic children and noted that these outcomes suggest that
"the absence of a genetic relationship, in itself, does not lead to difficulties for
parents or children."
77
75. Throughout this Article, I emphasize that biology is but one factor in establishing parentage.
As noted above, however, biology alone is oftentimes sufficient to establish parentage. For instance, the
Uniform Parentage Act provides that a man who is genetically related to a child should be legally
declared that child's parent. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 505(a), 9 U.L.A. 346 (2000). My emphasis on
nonbiological means of establishing parentage goes to the fact that in paternity fraud cases, often years
have elapsed before a man challenges his paternity. Because so much time has passed, children have
often come to rely on that parent-child relationship-emotionally, financially, or both. Thus, paternity
fraud cases actually bear similarity to situations in which nonbiological parents seek to maintain
visitation or custodial rights with children they have helped to raise. In fact, not all men who learn that
they are the child's nonbiological father wish to terminate the parent-child relationship. See, e.g.,
Michael Higgins, Meaning of Dad Widened by Judge, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 17, 2004, at 1 (describing an
Illinois judge's ruling that a man who signed a voluntary acknowledgement of parentage but is not the
child's biological father remains the child's legal father. In fact, this case arose because the
nonbiological father wished to maintain a parental relationship with the child in opposition to the
mother's wishes).
76. Jennifer E. Lansford et al., Does Family Structure Matter? A Comparison of Adoptive, Two-
Parent Biological, Single-Mother, Stepfather, and Stepmother Households, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
840, 849 (2001). But see KRISTEN ANDERSON MOORE ET AL., CHILD TRENDS, MARRIAGE FROM A
CHILD'S PERSPECTIVE: How DOES FAMILY STRUCTURE AFFECT CHILDREN, AND WHAT CAN WE Do
ABOUT IT? 1-2 (Child Trends Research Brief, 2002) ("Children growing up with stepparents also have
lower levels of well-being than children growing up with biological parents. Thus, it is ... the presence
of two biological parents that seems to support children's development.")
77. Susan Golombok & Clare Murray, Social Versus Biological Parenting: Family Functioning
and the Socioemotional Development of Children Conceived by Egg or Sperm Donation, 40 J. CHILD
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There are a multitude of methods by which families are being formed and
biology is but one component. In fact, biology may be irrelevant to a
determination of parentage in certain cases. For instance, a married couple
petitioned a California court to determine the legal parents of a baby born to a
surrogate mother and anonymous semen donor.78 The court concluded that the
married couple were the child's legal parents because they intended to parent
the child and, but for their intention, the child would not have been born.79 In
another case, a court was required to determine which woman was a child's
mother: the surrogate, gestational mother or the egg donor.80 Again, focusing
on the intent of one party over the other, the court concluded that the party who
81intended to parent the child was indeed the legal parent.
In other cases, functioning as a parent has caused courts to recognize a
party's right to maintain an ongoing relationship with a child he or she has
helped to raise. For instance, in Rubano v. DiCenzo, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island held that a nonbiological lesbian mother who had coparented the
child, intended to coparent the child, and functioned as a parent for a period of
four years could successfully argue that she was a legal parent of the child
based on the combined application of estoppel principles and the Uniform
Parentage Act. Similarly, in VC. v. MJ.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a nonbiological lesbian coparent had functioned as a psychological
parent and was entitled to visitation with the twins she had intended to parent
and helped to raise. 3 And in Youmans v. Ramos, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that a child's aunt was a de facto parent, and awarded her
visitation rights over the custodial father's objections.
8 4
Several states have enacted legislation specifically recognizing the rights of
de facto parents. In Indiana, for example, the legislature in 1999 amended
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 519, 525 (1999) (determining that genetic and nongenetic families did not
differ with respect to quality of parenting or the psychological development of the child).
78. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280.
79. Id.
80. Johnson, 851 P.2d 776.
81. Id.
82. 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). In Rubano, a former same-sex partner petitioned for visitation with
son with whom she had lived and helped raise for four years. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
that the former same-sex partner could prove her legal parentage pursuant to Rhode Island's version of
the Uniform Parentage Act by establishing a de facto or psychological parental relationship, using
standards similar to those articulated in the ALL Principles. Id. at 974-75. Significantly, the court
specifically noted that biological parentage was not a requirement to proving parentage under the statute
and that de facto parentage could sufficiently establish a legal parent-child relationship. Id. at 968. For
a full discussion of the Rubano case, see Jacobs, supra note 62, at 383-89.
83. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000). Similar to the Rubano case, VC. involved a former
same-sex partner who petitioned for custody and visitation rights with the twins she had helped to parent
since their birth (she had also participated in the pregnancy). Although the court did not hold that a legal
parent-child relationship existed, the court recognized that V.C. was a psychological parent (similar to
parent by estoppel, discussed below) and awarded her ongoing visitation with the twins.
84. 711 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1999).
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statutes governing certain custody proceedings to recognize the rights of de
facto parents.85 The Indiana statute defines a de facto guardian, in part, as
a person who has been the primary caregiver for, and financial
supporter of, a child who has resided with that person for at least: (1)
six months if the child is less than three years of age; or (2) one year if
the child is at least three years of age. 6
Using the Indiana statute, the court of appeals of Indiana has recognized the
right of a stepfather to maintain a claim of custody and visitation with the
daughter that he had actively parented and cared for since her birth. 7
Kentucky and Minnesota have similarly enacted statutes recognizing the legal
rights of de facto parents.88
In addition to cases and state statutes recognizing the rights of
nonbiological parents, both the UPA and ALI recognize that nonbiological
parents may be entitled to the same rights and recognition as biological parents
when they have functioned as a parent in a variety of respects. The American
Law Institute has promulgated Principles governing the allocation of custodial
and decision-making responsibility for children. The ALI Princples define
three types of "parents": legal parent, parents by estoppel, de facto parents.8 9 A
legal parent is an individual who is defined as a parent under state law.90 A
parent by estoppel is defined as:
an individual who, though not a legal parent, ... (ii) lived with the
child for at least two years and (a) over that period had a reasonable
good-faith belief that he was the child's biological father, based on
marriage to the mother or on the actions or representations of the
mother, and fully accepted parental responsibilities consistent with that
belief, and (b) thereafter continued to make reasonable, good-faith
efforts to accept responsibilities as the child's father, even if that belief
no longer existed; or (iii) lived with the child since the child's birth,
holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a
parent, a part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal
85. Nunn v. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing amended statutes).
86. IND. CODE § 31-9-2-35.5 (2004).
87. Nunn, 791 N.E.2d at 786-87 (holding that where man had functioned as child's parent since
birth and had actively fostered a parent-child relationship, biological mother could not preclude
stepfather from maintaining custody and visitation action if such ongoing relationship would be in
child's best interests).
88. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(1); MINN. STAT. § 257C.01 (2003). See Lowell F. Schechter,
"De Facto Custodians" or "De Facto Parents": Alternative Approaches to Child Custody Reform (2003)
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the International Society of Family Law North American
Conference in Eugene, Oregon) (on file with author) (reviewing the de facto custodian statutes of
Kentucky, Indiana, and Minnesota and discussing their application, and reviewing the ALl Principles
and comparing them with the state statutes noted herein).
89. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1) (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
90. Id. § 2.03(l)(a).
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parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child
together with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court
finds that recognition as a parent is in the child's best interests; or (iv)
lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting
full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an
agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal
parents, both parents), when the court finds that recognition as a parent
is in the child's best interests. 91
A de facto parent is defined, in part, as someone who regularly performed a
share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom
the child primarily lived.92 This emphasis both on functional parenthood and
the child's best interests within the ALI Principles further serves to reinforce
the necessity of looking beyond biology in establishing or disestablishing
parentage.
Additionally, the ALl Principles recognize the importance of intent and/or
time period of functional parenting for making a legal determination of
parentage. Just as the UPA has incorporated a two-year statute of limitations
for challenging a presumption of paternity or rescinding an acknowledgment of
paternity, the ALI similarly recognizes that a two-year period of functional
parenthood makes enough impact on the child that that period is sufficient to
establish the rights and privileges of legal parenthood.93 Moreover, the ALI
recognizes the importance of intent in determining the rights of functional
parents. For example, a woman who actively participates in the conception,
pregnancy, and birth of a child with her lesbian partner and further has an oral
or written agreement to coparent that child may be recognized as a parent by
estoppel even if she resides with the child for fewer than two years.
94
Similarly, the UPA recognizes both biological and nonbiological bases of
establishing legal fatherhood. The UPA provides several ways by which a
father-child relationship may be established, including: 1) an unrebutted
presumption of the man's paternity of a child under Section 204;95 2) an
effective acknowledgment of paternity by the man, with the agreement of the
mother, in a written document that has the same force and effect as an
91. Id. § 2.03(l)(b).
92. Id. § 2.03(l)(c).
93. As reprinted above, two of the means by which a person may be deemed a parent by estoppel
involve living with the child for at least two years. PRINCIPLES, supra note 89, § 2.03 (1)(b)(ii) and (iv).
Moreover, the ALl Principles includes in its definition of de facto parent a requirement that the
individual lived with the child "for a significant period of time not less than two years." § 2.03 (1)(c).
Thus, in creating functional families, a two-year period has been deemed significant enough to warrant
full or partial legal parental status. My argument suggests that if two years is significant enough to
warrant such legal recognition, we should not permit men who have functioned as parents for a greater
length of time to disestablish their parental relationships.
94. PRINCIPLES, supra note 89, § 2.03(l)(b)(iii) & cmts.
95. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(1), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2000).
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adjudication of paternity;96 3) an adjudication of the man's paternity in a
judicial proceeding; 97 and 4) a divorce decree indicating that the man is the
father of a child bom during the marriage. 98 Of these four bases of paternity,
two are not predicated on biology. Within the paternity presumptions of UPA
section 204, is a presumption predicated on openly holding out a child as his
own and residing within the same household as the child for two years.99 The
Comment for this section explains that the presumption of "holding oneself out
as the father" has the same two-year durational requirement as the marital
presumption. Once the presumption arises, it is subject to challenge in only
limited circumstances and is also subject to estoppel principles. 100 Moreover,
adhering to the common law presumption, a mother's husband is presumed to
be the child's father, regardless of whether he is indeed the biological father.101
As the UPA, ALI, and functional parenthood cases and statutes
demonstrate, genetic connection with a child does not provide the exclusive
method of establishing a parent-child relationship. In fact, it is becoming
increasingly common to establish legal parent-child relationships without any
genetic connection between a parent and child. Therefore, focusing on biology
as the single most significant aspect of the parent-child relationship within the
context of paternity disestablishment is at great odds with current family law
trends. More significantly, while biology may suffice to establish a parent-
child relationship so that a man may develop an emotional relationship with his
child, once such a relationship has been legally established and relied upon, as
in the paternity fraud context, considering only biology to disestablish the
parent-child relationship ignores the preexisting relationship. Relying solely on
biology to disestablish an existing parent-child relationship ignores the fact that
the child may have come to rely upon her father for emotional and/or financial
support. As discussed below, in keeping with a heightened emphasis on
functional parent-child relationships rather than on biological relationships,
several courts have rejected paternity disestablishment claims.
96. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2000). As part of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(C), (the
Welfare Reform Act) Congress conditioned federal child support enforcement funds on a requirement
that states enact laws that greatly strengthen the effect of a man's voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity. Thus, a valid, unrescinded and unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity is given the same
force and effect as a judicial determination of paternity. UNiF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 313
(2000).
97. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(3), 9B U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2002).
98. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(c), 9B U.L.A. 352 (2002). Under this section, a divorce decree is
determinative on the issue of paternity.
99. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002).
100. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002).
101. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002).
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III. ENFORCING PATERNITY JUDGMENTS AND REJECTING CLAIMS OF
PATERNITY FRAUD
A. Challenging Paternity Under the UPA and State Civil Procedure Rules
The UPA not only provides various mechanisms by which a man can be
established as a legal father, it also provides several ways by which the non-
existence of a parent-child relationship can be established. First, as noted
above, presumptions of paternity can be rebutted by a judicial proceeding.
However, the UPA includes a two-year statute of limitations during which the
presumptions can be rebutted, except in situations where the presumed father
did not cohabit with the child and the presumed father never held the child out
as his own. 10 2 Furthermore, an acknowledgment of paternity generally may be
rescinded only within 60 days from either the effective date or the date of the
first hearing to adjudicate an issue pertaining to the child and to which the
signatory is a party. 103 After the sixty-day period has elapsed, a signatory to an
acknowledgment of paternity may challenge the acknowledgment only if the
challenge is made within two years after the filing of the acknowledgment and
if he can prove fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.1 4 By maintaining a
two-year statute of limitations even in instances of fraud, duress or material
mistake of fact, the UPA drafters seem to recognize that after a two-year
period, the father and child will have a relationship that cannot be severed
without harm to the child and thus cannot be disestablished regardless of the
circumstances.
The UPA seeks to balance the rights of nonbiological father and child by
including a two-year statute of limitations that applies to challenges to
102. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607, 9B U.L.A. 341 (2002). The Comment to section 607 explains
that if the presumed father never cohabited with the mother and child, did not engage in intercourse at
the probable time of conception, and the presumed father never held the child out as his own, then the
presumption should not be limited by the two-year statute of limitations. The drafters reason that in
such a circumstance, nonpatemity is generally assumed by all of the parties. Id.
103. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 307, 9B U.L.A. 317 (2002).
A signatory may rescind an acknowledgment of paternity... by commencing a proceeding
to rescind before the earlier of: (1) 60 days after the effective date of the acknowledgment...
or (2) the date of the first hearing, in a proceeding to which the signatory is a party, before a
court to adjudicate an issue relating to the child, including a proceeding that establishes
support.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(c)(D)(ii) (2004), in order to retain federal child support subsidies,
state law must provide signatories with a right of rescission of an acknowledgment of paternity. UNNF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 307, 9B U.L.A. 317, cmt. at 317.
104. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 308, 9B U.LA. 317 (2002). This section ensures that a legal father
will not seek to disestablish his legal parenthood more than two years after he acknowledged paternity
and further reinforces the principle that a man who voluntarily acknowledges paternity should not be
able to change his mind, even if he later learns that he has no genetic connection to the child. The
requirement of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact reinforces the principle that he has voluntarily
undertaken the rights and responsibilities of parenthood and should not be relieved of those
responsibilities.
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presumptions of paternity, rescissions of acknowledgment of paternity, and
third-party challenges to an adjudication of paternity. The only instance for
which the two-year statute of limitations is extended is when the presumed
father never cohabited with the child and never held the child out as his own.
In that instance, the UPA drafters profess, neither the child nor the mother
would have relied on the paternity presumption. 105 For all other presumptions,
acknowledgments, and adjudications of paternity, the two-year statute of
limitations applies. This two-year statute of limitations serves a reasonable
purpose of ensuring that the best interests of the child are met. It preserves an
intact parent-child relationship, while also providing a legal but nonbiological
father with a reasonable amount of time to disestablish paternity if
circumstances warrant.'
0 6
There are several contexts in which a man may want to challenge a
paternity judgment. First, a man who was married to the child's mother may
learn subsequent to a divorce proceeding that he is not the child's biological
father. °7 Second, a man who has acknowledged paternity or was declared a
legal father pursuant to a paternity judgment may also learn subsequent to those
proceedings that he has no biological connection to the child. Often, courts
apply principles of res judicata and estoppel to preclude paternity
disestablishment in these situations.10 8 The UPA provides that a divorce decree
that expressly identifies a child as a "child of the marriage" or similar words or
the divorce decree provides that the husband will pay support for the child has
the binding effect of a determination of parentage. 0 9 The UPA provides that a
signatory to an unrescinded acknowledgment of parentage and a man
adjudicated as a legal father in a judicial proceeding are also bound by those
judgments." 0 Furthermore, the UPA provides that a man seeking to challenge
the paternity judgment may challenge the adjudication only under state law
relating to appeal, vacation of judgments, or other judicial review." 1
Typically, then, in their attempts to vacate a final paternity judgment,
nonbiological fathers use their state's equivalent of Federal Rules of Civil
105. See supra note 102. 1 thus infer that the UPA drafters believe that a challenge five, ten, or
fifteen years later would not harm the child's best interests. The statute of limitations that I propose does
not include this exception. While I understand the UPA drafters' position that there is little emotional
reliance on paternity in those circumstances, there are still financial and practical considerations that
militate against such a result, namely access to governmental benefits and assistance and/or inheritance
benefits. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for discussion of the legal and tangible benefits
to a child of a legal parental relationship.
106. But see Brie S. Rogers, Note, The Presumption of Paternity in Child Support Cases: A
Triumph of Law Over Biology, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1151 (2002) (arguing that the UPA approach is too
restrictive and that two years does not provide a sufficient time period in which to challenge paternity).
107. For information concerning paternity challenges during divorce proceedings, see supra note
26.
108. See, e.g., infra Section III.B.
109. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(c), 9B U.L.A. 352 (2000).
110. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(a), 9B U.L.A. 352 (2000).
111. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 637(e), 9B U.L.A. 352 (2000).
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Procedure 60(b), which permits a court to vacate a final judgment in the
instance of fraud, duress, material mistake or other equitable reason. 112  For
Rule 60(b) motions based upon allegations of fraud, mistake, or newly
discovered evidence, the motion must be made within one year after the
judgment was entered.'1 3  A motion under Rule 60(b)(6), which permits the
court to vacate a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief," must be
made within a reasonable time. Determining what constitutes a reasonable time
is particularly troublesome in the paternity fraud context.' Is it fair to require
a man to support a child for another five, ten, or fifteen years if he knows the
child is not his? But is it fair to vacate the judgment if he held himself out as
the child's father for the previous ten years? It is also difficult to determine
what constitutes a fraud upon the court or an intentional misrepresentation."'
Has the mother acted fraudulently if she did not reveal the possibility that
another man might be the biological father of the child? Is that a fraud upon
the court to warrant application of Rule 60(b) relief? 116  And, even if the
mother's conduct is deemed fraudulent, is it fair to the child and in the child's
best interests to sever the father-child relationship?
B. Cases Enforcing Paternity Judgments
It has been difficult for legal fathers to disestablish paternity subsequent to
a paternity judgment or divorce decree." 7  As discussed above, a paternity
judgment has binding effect and cannot easily be challenged. With the
increased reliability and certainty of genetic testing, however, more men are
challenging judgments of paternity and seeking relief, in particular, from child
112. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b). The rule provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party... from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake... ; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud .. : misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; ... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more
than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
113. Id.
114. As discussed infra, cases in which courts deny paternity disestablishment claims, are often
predicated in part on the notion that too much time has elapsed and it would be unfair to the child to
disestablish paternity. Alternatively, however, several courts have permitted paternity disestablishment
claims after many years. See Section IV.A.
115. Compare Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2001) (holding that mother's actions of
not telling adjudged father that he may not be biological father does not constitute fraud upon the court),
with Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 2003) (holding that mother's misrepresentation of paternity
was fraud and legal father could thus disestablish paternity).
116. See, e.g., Nadine E. Roddy, The Preclusive Effect of Paternity Findings in Divorce Decrees,
10 DIVORCE LITIG. 169, 172-73 (1998) (discussing the fraud exception to res judicata and citing cases in
which the court determined that former husbands were not able to prove fraud to invoke the exception).
117. Id. at 184 ("[T]he vast majority of states have held that [divorced husbands] are precluded
from subsequently challenging a divorce decree's finding of paternity even when the wife
misrepresented the husband's paternity or concealed the husband's nonpatemity from the husband and
the court.").
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support obligations. Many courts have denied such paternity disestablishment
petitions, largely relying on the doctrines of res judicata, estoppel, or preclusion
of the claim under Rule 60(b), either independently or in combination. Below,
I discuss several cases illustrating the complex balancing between the best
interests of the child and fairness to the nonbiological father.
In 2001, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the petition of a
man who sought paternity disestablishment more than five years after he
voluntarily acknowledged paternity of his daughter, Cheryl."' In November
1993, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (DOR), on behalf of the
Department of Transitional Assistance and Cheryl's mother, filed a complaint
to establish paternity and a support order for Cheryl. 19 On December 16,
1993, the father and mother executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity
and the father also executed a support agreement.1 20 Despite the availability of
genetic marker testing, the father did not submit to such testing prior to
executing the acknowledgment and the record does not explain why. The same
day, a judge entered a judgment of paternity.121
Following entry of the judgment, the father behaved as though he were
Cheryl's father, and she always referred to him as "Daddy." He and his family
visited and bonded with Cheryl; on two occasions he sought to expand his
visitation rights with Cheryl, and he generally fostered a "substantial
relationship" with her. 122 After his child support obligation was increased in
1999, Cheryl's father for the first time made a motion for genetic testing and
asserted that he doubted he was her biological father. He further alleged that he
had doubted his paternity as early as Cheryl's birth and had information
confirming his nonpatemity when Cheryl was two years old.123  Twice his
motions for genetic testing and reduction in child support were denied, and he
then took Cheryl for genetic testing without the knowledge of her mother.1
24
The tests revealed that he was not Cheryl's biological father and, in January
2000, he moved to vacate the paternity judgment and further moved for
125reimbursement of all the child support he had paid since 1993. In May 2000,
118. Paternity of Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 491-93 (noting that Cheryl was born in 1993 and suit was
brought in 2000).
119. Id. The DOR moved for a temporary order of support and an order that the father, mother, and
child submit to genetic marker testing. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 492.
122. Id.
123. Id. As grounds for his motion for genetic marker testing, Cheryl's father alleged that he bore
little resemblance to Cheryl; that two friends of the mother told him subsequent to his paternity
acknowledgment that he was not Cheryl's father; that testing of his semen in June 1996 indicated a low
sperm count and infertility; and that Cheryl's mother had told him he was not Cheryl's father. Id. at
493.
124. Id. at 493. Under both my proposal and the UPA, a father is not permitted to take a child for
genetic testing without first obtaining court approval, based upon a judicial determination that such
testing would be in the child's best interests. See infra note 205.
125. Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at491-93.
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the parties were ordered to submit to genetic testing. The judge indicated that
if the tests revealed that the father was not Cheryl's biological parent, he would
be entitled to relief because "the father's 'interests in no longer being obligated
to support a child not his own' outweighed Cheryl's interests 'in maintaining a
relationship with someone she believed to be her biological father."
126
Pursuant to Massachusetts Rules Civil Procedure 60(b), the father moved
to have the judgment vacated.127  The court, noting the importance of the
finality of paternity judgments, wrote that "consideration of what is in a child's
best interests will often weigh more heavily than the genetic link between
parent and child., 128 The language of this passage demonstrates that the court
is aware that a child's best interests will be best served by maintaining a
functional parent relationship and that destroying that relationship solely for
reasons of genetic identity does not likely benefit a child. Furthermore, the
court noted, where the father and child have a substantial parent-child
relationship, "an attempt to undo a determination of paternity is potentially
devastating to a child who has considered the man to be the father.,
129
Balancing the interests of Cheryl against those of her legal father, the court
determined that Cheryl's interests outweighed his, despite conclusive evidence
of nonpatemity.t30
The father further argued that his petition should not be time barred
because the mother perpetrated a fraud upon the court by failing to disclose that
he may not have been biologically related to Cheryl. The court found that
the actions of Cheryl's mother did not meet the legal definition of fraud and
denied the father's petition. The court further noted that it could neither protect
Cheryl from learning that her legal father was not biologically related to her nor
force her father to continue his emotional relationship with her; but it did
specifically note that it could protect her financial security and other legal
rights. 1 32  While not specifically articulating the principles of paternity by
estoppel, the court essentially used those principles by denying the father's
challenge because of his prior actions and his efforts to foster a relationship
with her. Part of the importance of the finality of the judgment, it seems, is the
126. Id. at 494.
127. It appears that he relied on either the application of MASS. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(5), entitling him to
have the judgment vacated if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application, or application of rule 60(b)(6), permitting vacation of the judgment for any other equitable
reason. Because the father moved to vacate the judgment based on newly discovered genetic evidence,
the mother argued that the father was actually making a motion pursuant to rule 60(b) (1)-(3), and that
therefore his claims were time barred because they were not made within one year. Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d
at 494.
128. Id. at 495 (citing State ex rel. J.Z., 668 So.2d 566, 569 (Ala. 1995)).
129. Id. at 496 (citing Hackley v. Hackley, 426 Mich. 582, 598 n.l 1 (1986)).
130. Id. at499.
131. Id. at 498. The court stated that a fraud on the court involved the "most egregious conduct"
involving the "corruption of the judicial process itself." Id.
132. Id. at 498-99.
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court's concern that Cheryl's interests be protected through continuity and
stability of the father-child relationship. Where a father has affirmatively
sought out a relationship with a child, he cannot later claim genetic
nonpaternity as a means of discharging his parental obligation. While the
ruling may not have helped Cheryl, who learned that her "daddy" was not
related to her, the precedent should protect other children from such emotional
harm.
Courts have similarly denied divorced fathers the right to disestablish
paternity years after entry of a divorce decree, i.e., years after legal fatherhood
has been established. In Godin v. Godin,133 the Supreme Court of Vermont
denied the request of a former husband who sought to vacate his paternity six
years after the entry of a divorce decree. In Godin, the former husband became
suspicious that he was not the biological father of Christina after hearing family
rumors to that effect and based on questioning by Christina herself.
134
Although he did not challenge paternity at any time during divorce proceedings
and, in fact, stipulated to his paternity of Christina, he "realized" that ten
months elapsed between Christina's alleged conception and her birth. 135  He
sought genetic marker testing and to vacate that part of the divorce decree that
established his paternity.
Christina was fifteen years old when her father sought to disestablish
paternity. Mr. Godin alleged that his ex-wife had perpetrated a fraud upon the
court by alleging that Christina was his child and that the court should set aside
his paternity and child support obligation. 136 The court determined that merely
alleging that Mr. Godin was Christina's biological father did not constitute
fraud. Mr. Godin could have easily challenged paternity based on the elapsed
time between alleged conception and birth at the time of divorce; this was not
newly discovered evidence to warrant relitigation of the issue.137 Denying Mr.
Godin's request for genetic testing and vacation of his paternity obligation, the
court noted that Mr. Godin had lived with Christina as her father for the first
eight years of her life and continued to treat her as his daughter for six years
thereafter. 38 The court continued, "It is thus readily apparent that a parent-
child relationship was formed, and it is that relationship, and not the results of a
genetic test, that must control."' 139 Recognizing that parenthood encompasses
133. 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998).
134. Id. at 906.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 908-09. In a rather draconian response to the Supreme Court of Vermont, the Vermont
legislature has introduced legislation that would create the crime of "paternity fraud." If the mother is
found guilty of this crime, she can be subject to a fine and imprisonment. Furthermore, the legal father
can sue the mother for restitution and may also sue the biological father. See H.R. 735, 2002 Leg.,
2001-2002 Sess. (Vt. 2002), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2002/bills/intro/H-735.HTM.
(Last visited November 21,2004).
138. Id. at 910-11.
139. Id. at 911.
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more than mere biology, the court also wrote, "[T]he presumption of paternity
has assumed even greater significance today, as alternative methods of
conception unrelated to 'biology' of the presumed parent have become more
common."
140
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a
divorced father was precluded from challenging the paternity of his eleven-
year-old daughter, Crystal. 14  Five years after entry of the divorce decree,
William filed a petition to terminate child support on the ground that he was not
Crystal's biological father.142  William argued that rigid application of res
judicata would not serve the best interests of the child and suggested that it was
preferential for Crystal to know the identity of her biological father. 143  The
court disagreed: William had held himself out as Crystal's father and had
exercised his right of visitation with her following the divorce.1 44 Thus, the
court determined that "undeniable harm" would result to Crystal if paternity
were vacated. 145  The court further recognized that William himself had
enjoyed the benefits of his representation as Crystal's father, including her love
and affection. In making its ruling, the court emphasized the child's rights.
The court discussed that while courts generally address children's rights within
the larger context of competing adults' rights, the current trend is to give
greater weight to children's rights.
146
140. Id. at 910.
141. Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 2002).
142. Id. at 80-81.
143. Id. at 81.
144. Id. at 86.
145. Id. The court, citing its opinion in Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 871 (W. Va.
1989), wrote that the "reviewing court must examine the issue of whether an 'individual attempting to
disestablish paternity has held himself out to be the father of the child for a sufficient period of time
such that disproof of paternity would result in undeniable harm to the child."' Betty L. W., 569 S.E.2d at
82.
146. Id. at 86. Specifically, the court relied upon the decisions in Wade v. Wade, 536 So.2d 1158,
1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), in which the court refused to vacate a paternity finding where the father
had enjoyed the benefits of fatherhood, including the child's love and affection, and In re Paternity of
Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, discussed supra. In contrast, Judge Maynard in his dissent framed the issue, in
part, as between the rights of the nonbiological father, who had unwittingly supported a child for eleven
years, and the mother who had committed paternity fraud. 569 S.E.2d at 87-88. Judge Maynard actually
noted Vermont's introduction of criminal legislation concerning paternity fraud and while writing that
that particular result would be too harsh, he continued, "[Clertainly we can find a middle ground
between jailing those who intentionally misrepresent paternity and rewarding them for their deception."
Id. at 88.
Judge Maynard also suggested that a child has a right to know his or her biological father, but
offered no reason for that contention other than the importance of medical history. Id. While
knowledge of one's medical history is certainly important, that does not address the parent-child
relationship. Why would Judge Maynard terminate an actual parent-child relationship upon the mere
hope that the child may learn the identity of her or his biological father? Moreover, there is no
guarantee that the biological father will choose to establish a parental relationship with the child. Judge
Maynard's argument is unpersuasive because it ignores the actual, functional parent-child relationship
and looks merely at the promise of a parent-child relationship due to mere genetics. As the cases in Part
IV illustrate, however, several courts agree with Judge Maynard that biological history alone may be a
sufficient reason to disestablish paternity.
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Courts that do not permit paternity disestablishment claims place the best
interests of the child ahead of the best interests of the nonbiological father. In
these cases, the child has an interest in maintaining the legal, financial, and
often emotional security that stem from the paternity adjudication. The finality
of the judgment serves an important purpose for the child-stability-that is
deemed more significant than genetic "truth." '147 While the father in these cases
is not relieved of his parental responsibilities, he is also rewarded with an
ongoing parent-child relationship. As Cheryl, Godin, and Betty W. suggest,
these nonbiological fathers have often nurtured positive relationships with their
children and have derived emotional benefit from the parent-child relationship
much as the children have. Ignoring the reality of the nonbiological father's
functional parenthood places too much emphasis on biology and ignores the
other aspects of fatherhood. Moreover, heightened emphasis on biology
contrasts with the trend of legalizing the parent child relationship based solely
on those other aspects of parenthood and not biology.
In addition, these courts recognized the primacy of the child's best interests
in maintaining an ongoing, functional parent-child relationship. As the Cheryl
opinion states, "[C]onsideration of what is in a child's best interests will often
weigh more heavily than the genetic link between parent and child.' 48 This
147. Even in cases in which the child and father have not enjoyed an emotionally significant
parent-child relationship, a court may recognize the importance of preserving the legal relationship, if
for no other reason than preserving the child's legal identity and legal rights. For example, twelve years
after J.T. was adjudicated the father of S.Z., he filed a motion seeking to set aside the paternity
judgment. In State ex rel. J.Z., the Supreme Court of Alabama determined that no extraordinary
circumstances existed to justify relief from a paternity judgment twelve years after its entry, even if
blood or genetic testing revealed that J.T. was not S.Z.'s biological father. 668 So.2d 566 (Ala. 1995).
In 1980, the state brought a paternity action on behalf of the mother to establish J.S.T. as the legal father
of S.Z. J.T. moved for blood tests, but did not appear for blood testing nor did he appear at subsequent
hearings. Thus, a default judgment was entered. Id. at 568. Between January 1981, when the default
judgment was entered, and 1992, when J.T. received notice of a tax lien, he was in and out of jail, had
little or no contact with the child, and (as noted by the trial court) neither the mother nor child relied on
J.T.'s adjudication of legal fatherhood.
When the state sought to enforce J.T.'s child support obligation, he claimed that he had been
unaware of the default judgment and requested blood tests in addition to filing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to
set aside the paternity judgment. The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that twelve years did not
constitute a reasonable time under Rule 60(b)(6) to bring a motion to vacate the paternity judgment, that
the interests of finality required that the litigation not be reopened, and that an order for blood testing
should not be granted. Id. at 570-71. Moreover, the court determined that J.T., even as a pro se litigant,
had a responsibility to be aware of the proceedings against him and he could not claim that he had no
knowledge of the judgment for twelve years.
The court briefly addressed the importance of the finality of paternity judgments, although it
did not formally address the best interests of the child. However, the emphasis on the importance of the
finality of paternity adjudications allows me to infer that the court was concerned with the negative
effect vacating a twelve-year-old paternity judgment would have on the child. Moreover, in the difficult
challenge to balance the best interests of children and their nonbiological fathers, the court was able to
put the best interests of the child first because the father had engaged in such an unreasonable delay.
Had the father sought blood testing twelve years earlier-or even moved for blood tests soon after the
default judgment entered-the court would likely have decided this case differently. Id.
148. Cheryl, 746 N.E.2d at 495 (citing J.Z., 668 So.2d at 569).
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demonstrates the court's demarcation between a child's best interests and the
genetic link between parent and child.
IV. PATERNITY DISESTABLISHMENT CASES AND STATUTES
In contrast to the cases in which the best interests of the child prevail and
paternity disestablishment is not permitted, several courts have permitted
disestablishment petitions. In addition, several states have enacted statutes
which specifically permit paternity disestablishment under certain
circumstances. Unlike the previously discussed cases, these cages and statutes
either do not consider the child's best interests or presume that genetic identity
serves the best interests. Moreover, the best interests discussion is often framed
in terms of the nonbiological father's best interests. Several of the paternity
disestablishment cases and statutes are discussed below.
A. Cases Permitting Paternity Disestablishment
Although many courts have rejected the attempts of legal fathers to
disestablish paternity based on genetic testing subsequent to a paternity
judgment, recently several courts have allowed nonbiological fathers to
disestablish their nonpaternity. The Maryland Court of Appeals determined in
Langston v. Riffe149 that the issue of paternity disestablishment does not require
a balancing test between the competing best interests of child and adjudicated
father. In fact, the court stated that the best interests of the child have no place
in the disestablishment of paternity because the child's best interests are not
considered in establishing paternity in the first instance.'
5 °
Langston actually involved three separate paternity appeals in which men
previously adjudicated to be the father of a child moved to set aside those
judgments based on new evidence that each man was not the father. 51 In all
three cases, the men voluntarily acknowledged their paternity and did not
request blood or genetic testing prior to acknowledging paternity.
Subsequently, each man learned that he might not be the biological father of the
child and sought genetic testing. The main issue before the Court of Appeals
was phrased as follows: "whether the trial court must consider the 'best
interests of the child' prior to ruling on whether to allow the post-declaration
149. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. App. Ct. 2000).
150. Id. at 406. Discussing the ability of men formerly adjudicated as fathers to obtain genetic
testing, the court wrote that,
[T]he Legislature intended for blood or genetic tests to be made available.., to any putative
father seeking to challenge a paternity declaration previously entered against him in which
such blood or genetic evidence test was not introduced. Moreover, an examination of the
best interests of the child has no place in that determination.
Id. (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 390.
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blood or genetic testing and the reconsideration of paternity."' 152 The court held
that a putative father who seeks to set aside a paternity declaration is
automatically entitled to such test without consideration of the child's best
interests. 1
53
By rejecting any consideration of the child's best interests, the court gives
the green light to any father who wishes to disestablish paternity, regardless of
the length or extent of the parent-child relationship. In fact, what is so apparent
about the best interests discussion in Langston is that if the court were required
to consider the child's best interests, the court would likely reject the
disestablishment petitions. By sidestepping the best interests analysis, the court
can sever the parent-child relationship despite the emotional and financial harm
to the child.
In stark contrast with the decision in Paternity of Cheryl, the Mississippi
Supreme Court recently held that a paternity judgment could be vacated more
than nine years after its entry. In MA.S. v. Mississippi Department of Htiman
Services,' 54 the father, M.A.S., agreed that he was the father of S.M., signed an
acknowledgment of paternity when he was seventeen years old, and agreed to
pay child support.1 55 DNA testing performed in an unrelated matter revealed
that M.A.S. was not the biological father of S.M., and he sought to set aside the
paternity and child support orders. 15 6 Pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6), the court set aside the paternity judgment, determining that
it would be "profoundly unjust" to require M.A.S. to continue making child
support payments.157 Although the court noted that collateral estoppel would
generally preclude M.A.S.'s claim, the court found that the new DNA evidence
proving M.A.S.'s nonpatemity was extraordinary and compelling enough to
warrant vacation of the prior judgment despite the nine-year interval. 1
58
Rather than placing emphasis on the child's best interests in preserving the
parent-child relationship, the court's focus centered on the best interest of the
father, M.A.S. The court noted multiple times that requiring the nonbiological
father to continue making support payments would be manifestly unjust.'
59
The court further noted that "DHS and the mother have not been prejudiced by
the failure to seek relief sooner. The mother received child support payments
for approximately ten years from the wrong person.' 60 In so doing, the court
did not hold M.A.S. responsible for voluntarily signing the acknowledgment of
152. Id. at 392.
153. Langston involved detailed analysis of Maryland statutes permitting disestablishment of
paternity. The statute is discussed infra at Section IV.B.
154. 842 So.2d 527 (Miss. 2003).




159. Id. at 531.
160. Id. at530.
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paternity despite his request for a blood test. In fact, the court placed no
responsibility upon M.A.S. and instead saw him as a hero who had supported
another man's child for nearly ten years. The language used by the court is
telling; by writing specifically of the fact that neither the mother nor the state
agency suffered any prejudice, the court completely ignored the child's
interests. The court never referred to the effect of its decision on the child, but
only the ruling's effect on the nonbiological father. The court did not discuss
the relationship between M.A.S. and S.M., how the relationship benefited them
both, how M.A.S. had received the benefits of parenting for nearly ten years, or
that S.M. might be traumatized by this decision. The court's focus was on the
injustice to M.A.S., and it failed to consider the injustice, stigma, or emotional
trauma for S.M.
Three months after issuing its decision in M.A.S., the Supreme Court of
Mississippi ruled that a divorced husband could disestablish paternity of his
child nine years after the child's birth. In Williams v. Williams, the court
"refuse[d] to sanction the manifest injustice of forcing a man to support a child
that science has proven not to be his.' 161 The facts of Williams reveal that the
parties separated when the child, Marcus, was approximately one month old,
and they divorced about two years later. 62 The divorce decree provided that
Willie was Marcus' father. Willie and Marcus did not have a close relationship
and did not regularly see each other, although they did have several visits.
During one visit, Willie noticed that Marcus bore little resemblance to him.
6
1
Willie had a genetic test that confirmed that Marcus was not his biological son
and sought to disestablish paternity. 64 His petition to disestablish paternity
was denied based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, so he decided to bring
a petition on behalf of Marcus against himself, Marcus' mother, and the man
Willie thought was, in fact, Marcus' biological father. 165  Genetic testing
proved that neither man was Marcus' biological father.166  The chancellor
denied Willie's petition and Willie appealed.
Relying on MA.S., the court stated that finality should yield to fairness.
The court reasoned that although the child may be an innocent victim of his
parent's problems, "the law will not compel one who has stood in the place of a
parent to support the child after the relationship has ceased.' 67 Addressing the
161. 843 So.2d 720,723 (Miss. 2003)
162. Id. at 721.
163. Id.
164. The way the facts are presented, it appears that Willie had a private paternity test conducted,
without the prior approval of the court. The court makes no mention of a motion for paternity testing. It




167. Id. (citing NPA v. WBA, 380 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. 1989), which held that husband who had
embraced a child as his own for four years should not be liable for ongoing child support after genetic
testing proved the child was in fact not biologically related).
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issue of the child's best interests, the court merely stated, "We believe that the
best interest of the child, in the factual scenario presented, is to know the
identity of the natural father."168  The court offered no explanation why
knowledge of Marcus' biological father would serve his interests better than
maintaining an existing, nine-year parent-child relationship. More
significantly, the court was offered compelling evidence that the mother did not
know the identity of Marcus' biological father.' 69 While the court specifically
noted that Willie and Marcus did not have a substantial relationship, the court
further noted that courts may terminate support obligations (and, by inference,
disestablish paternity) when the child and legal father have a more substantial
relationship.17
0
A recent Pennsylvania opinion similarly discounts the best interests of the
child and focuses solely upon the rights of the nonbiological father to have his
paternity judgment vacated. In Doran v. Doran, the ex-husband moved to
vacate his child support obligation after genetic testing revealed that his
probability of paternity was zero percent.17 ' Doran had never questioned
paternity prior to or during the parties' divorce, at which time the child, Billy,
was five years old. 72  A year or so later, however, Doran questioned his
paternity, but his former wife told him he was Billy's father. 173 Several years
later, Doran questioned his paternity again and convinced his ex-wife to allow
Billy to go for genetic testing. The testing revealed Doran's nonpaternity.
174
He then moved to vacate the child support order and underlying paternity order.
Furthermore, he "as gently as possible removed himself from the child's life in
168. Id. By absolving Willie of all parental responsibility, the court effectively "illegitimized"
Marcus. The court offered no compelling rationale for its result. In addition, the court's blind faith that
knowing one's biological father serves a child's best interests contains two major flaws. First, there is
no evidence to suggest that the biological father would want to engage in parent-child relationship, thus
the court is terminating a functional relationship in the hopes that another one will magically materialize.
Second, some studies suggest that nonbiological parents can and do "parent" every bit as well as
biological parents and that there is no substantive advantage to being raised by two biological parents.
See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. But see MARY PARKE, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL
POLICY, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY BETTER FOR CHILDREN? I (Couples and Marriage Series,
Policy Brief No. 3, 2003) ("Most researchers now agree ... that, on average, children do best when
raised by their two married, biological parents who have low-conflict relationships.")
169. Williams, 843 So.2d at 721.
170. Id. at 722-23 (citing NPA, 380 S.E.2d 178 and In re Bethards, 526 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa Ct. App.
1994)).
171. 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 2003). This case represents a significant change for the Pennsylvania
judiciary, which had previously decided in 1997 that an ex-husband could not disestablish paternity
despite genetic proof of nonpatemity. Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (1997); see also
discussion supra note 8. In Miscovich, the court characterized the ex-husband's attempt to disestablish
paternity as disgusting. 688 A.2d at 732. Despite similar facts, the Pennsylvania court changed course
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a way which he felt would cause the child the least amount of anguish and
hurt." 1
75
Beginning its analysis, the court examined the applicability of the marital
presumption and whether it should preclude Doran's claim of nonpaternity.
The court noted that the marital presumption of paternity was designed to
preserve families and, in light of the parties' divorce, did not apply. 176 More
significantly, however, the court stated that estoppel did not apply in this case
because of the wife's fraud. 177 The court said that Doran would never have
held himself out as Billy's father, acted as a parent, provided him emotional
and financial support if not for the ex-wife's misrepresentation of Doran's
paternity. 178 The court quoted and adopted in large part the trial judge's
opinion; the characterizations of both parties by the trial judge reflect the
rhetoric of paternity fraud activists who paint the nonbiological father as a hero
who supported another man's child as a result of the deceit of the child's
mother. In evaluating the actions of Billy's mother, the trial court wrote,
"Unfortunately, her deceit, falsehoods and misrepresentations gave Mr. Doran
no reason but to treat the child as his own-with love, care and respect, as only
a decent human being would do under the circumstances."'
' 79
What I find most fascinating about the court's characterization is that it
depicts Doran as a loving, caring father; if this is so, why is he so anxious to
sever all ties with this child? Even though he has no genetic tie to Billy, he has
fostered a loving, parenting relationship---no different from an adoptive father,
stepfather, or other nonbiological parent. How is the parent-child relationship
any different now that the father knows he shares no genetic material with his
son? Nowhere in the opinion does the court address Billy's best interests and
the trauma he likely experienced when, at age eleven, his father "gently
removed himself' from his life. Moreover, the court does not see beyond
biology, even while lauding the many other aspects of fatherhood Doran
175. Id. (quoting the lower court's decision, Order No. DR-454 of 1994 (Penn. Ct. Com. P1. 2002)).
176. Id. at 1283 ("The policy underlying the presumption of paternity is the preservation of
marriages .... The presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the
application; otherwise, it does not apply.") (quoting Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999)).
177.
The presumption that a child born during a marriage is a child of the marriage and the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel grew out of a concern for the protection of the family unit;
where that unit no longer exists, it defies both logic and fairness to apply equitable principles
to perpetuate a pretense. In this case, application of estoppel would punish the party that
sought to do what was righteous and reward the party that has perpetrated a fraud.
Id. at 1283-84 (quoting Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 405,410 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)).
Interestingly, the court writes of concern for the protection of the family unit but never
engages in a discussion concerning protection for the child. While the parties are no longer married,
why does the court seem eager to further disintegrate the family unit by disestablishing paternity? Isn't
the purpose of estoppel to protect the parent and child relationship, not merely to preserve an intact
nuclear family? See supra Section II.B for a discussion of functional parenthood, including parentage
by estoppel, and its use to protect multiple types of nontraditional parent-child relationships.
178. Doran, 820 A.2d at 1284.
179. Id. (quoting the lower court's decision, Order No. DR-454 of 1994 (Penn. Ct. Com. P. 2002)).
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exhibited. By dismissing the functional aspects of parenthood as secondary to
biology, the court trivializes Doran's years of parenting and renders Billy
fatherless.
B. Statutes Permitting Paternity Disestablishment
Several states have enacted legislation explicitly permitting paternity
disestablishment upon a clear showing of genetic impossibility of paternity.8 °
These statutes enable courts to circumvent the typical strictures of the finality
of judgments; specifically, these statutes provide a loophole to the typical Rule
60(b) application. Some paternity set-aside statutes contain no statute of
limitations and allow for a paternity challenge at any time;' 8 1 others contain
various limitations on the time during which a petitioner may challenge
paternity. 182 Additionally, several statutes mandate that a court shall set aside a
paternity judgment if blood or genetic tests clearly prove an absence of
biological connection between a legal father and his child.1 83  Others grant
courts discretion to set aside the paternity judgment.'
84
The Maryland statute is illustrative of laws mandating paternity
disestablishment without a statute of limitations. In 1995, Maryland modified
its paternity laws to allow a paternity judgment to be set aside if a blood or
genetic test establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in
180. See generally Louis J. Tesser, Dad or Duped? Post-Appeal Challenges to Paternity
Judgments, FAM. ADVOc., Fall 2002, at 29 (discussing several paternity fraud statutes and the various
approaches states have used in permitting paternity disestablishment).
181. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-7-54 (2002) (permitting a petitioner to bring a motion to set
aside a determination of paternity at any time); IOWA CODE § 600B.41A(3)(a) (2003) (establishment of
paternity may be overcome if the action is filed prior to the child reaching majority).
182. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (b)(2) (2002) (providing that a petition to disestablish
paternity may be brought "only within three years after the child's birth or three years after the petitioner
knew or should have known of the father's putative paternity of the child, whichever is later"); M[NN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.57(b) (West 2003)
For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and child relationship ... only if
the action is brought within two years after the person bringing the action has reason to
believe that the presumed father is not the father of the child, but in no event later than three
years after the child's birth.
(emphasis added).
183. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115 (2003). The Arkansas statute provides, in part:
When any man has been adjudicated to be the father of a child or is deemed to be the father
of a child pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity without the benefit of scientific testing
for paternity and as a result was ordered to pay support, he shall be entitled to one (1)
paternity test ... at any time during the period of time that he is required to pay child support
upon the filing of a motion challenging the adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity.
Id. § 9-10-115(e)(1)(A). The statute further provides that:
[i]f the test administered under subdivision (e)(l)(A) of this section excludes the adjudicated
father or man deemed to be the father pursuant to an acknowledgment of paternity as the
biological father of the child and the court so finds, the court shall set aside the previous
finding or establishment of paternity and relieve him of any future obligation of support as of
the date of finding.
§ 9-10-115(0(1).
184. E.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45 § 7(b-5) (2004) ("If, as a result of... [DNA] tests, the plaintiff
is determined not to be the father of the child, the adjudication of paternity.. . may be vacated.").
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the order. 85 Moreover, any party may request a blood or genetic test at any
time, even after the entry of the final paternity order, if blood or genetic testing
did not occur prior to the entry of the order.' 86  As discussed above, the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Langston v. Riffe interpreted these statutes to
exclude any consideration of the best interests of the child and to place all
emphasis on the blood or genetic test results.' 87 The Maryland statute contains
no statute of limitations and, as such, a claim to disestablish paternity may be
brought at any time. As Langston reveals, a man may have been adjudicated
the legal father or even acknowledged paternity of a child and then request
genetic testing years after the judgment or order of paternity was entered.
Without any consideration of the child's best interests, the court will permit
such testing and, if the test reveals that the man is not the biological father,
paternity may be disestablished.1
8
185. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (2003). In discussing the finality of paternity
declarations, the statute provides:
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a declaration of paternity is
final.
(2)(i) A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside:
2. If a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle
establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order.
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, a declaration of paternity may
not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged
paternity knowing he was not the father.
Id. § 5-1038(a).
186. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029. Blood or Genetic Tests
(b) In general On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own
motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or
genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of
the child.
(f) Laboratory report as evidence (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this
subsection, the laboratory report of the blood or genetic test shall be received in evidence if:
(i) definite exclusion is established; or
(ii) the testing is sufficiently extensive to exclude 97.3% of alleged fathers who are not
biological fathers, and the statistical probability of the alleged father's paternity is at
least 97.3%.
187. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. App. Ct. 2000). The court wrote:
We hold.., that the Legislature intended for blood or genetic tests to be made available,
upon a motion, to any putative father seeking to challenge a paternity declaration previously
entered against him in which such blood or genetic test evidence was not introduced.
Moreover, an examination of the best interests of the child has no place in that determination.
Id. at 406.
188. The statute does not mandate that paternity shall be disestablished; instead, the language of the
statute (as reproduced supra note 185) provides that a declaration of paternity may be modified or set
aside. However, the set aside provision contains no best interests requirement. Interestingly, the
statutory subsection concerning "other orders subject to modification," (e.g., support and/or arrearages)
does include a best interests test. Without best-interests language concerning the paternity set aside, it is
unlikely that a court will feel obligated to maintain a paternity order when genetic testing reveals
biological nonpatemity. In particular, the court's holding that best interests of the child should not be
considered either in making a determination to permit genetic testing nor "in the consideration of
paternity" means that Maryland judges will have little discretion in paternity set aside cases. Langston,
754 A.2d at 411.
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Georgia recently enacted a paternity set-aside statute as well, which
contains no statute of limitations and in certain instances, provides for
mandatory paternity disestablishment. Georgia's statute allows a man to bring
a motion to set aside paternity by filing an affidavit that newly discovered
evidence has come to his knowledge since entry of the judgment and that the
results from scientifically credible parentage-determination genetic testing
finds that there is zero percent probability that the male is the child's biological
father. 189 The statute further provides that "[t]he court shall grant relief...
upon a finding" that the test was properly conducted, that the man has not
adopted the child, that the child was not conceived by artificial insemination,
that the man did not act to prevent the biological father from asserting his
paternal rights, and that he has not done any of the following acts knowing that
he is not the biological father: (1) married the child's mother; (2) acknowledged
paternity in a sworn statement; (3) been named, with his consent, as the child's
father on the birth certificate; (4) been required to support the child based on a
written promise; (5) received notice from any agency requiring him to submit
to genetic testing which he disregarded; or (6) signed a voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity. 190
As noted, the Georgia law contains no statute of limitations and
furthermore does not provide for any best interests analysis. Thus, a man who
has acted as a child's father for ten years, but who had no knowledge of his
genetic nonpaternity, may petition for paternity disestablishment, and the court
must set aside the judgment upon a showing of genetic nonpaternity. Even if
the result would be injurious to the child, the court is given no discretion under
the statute. Moreover, the statute further provides that even if a man is not
entitled to the mandatory, automatic relief discussed above (because he does
not meet each necessary requirement), he may petition for paternity
disestablishment nonetheless. Section 19-7-54(c) of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated provides that if the petitioner fails to make the requisite
showing under section 19-7-54(b), the court may still enter an order as to
paternity as otherwise provided by law.191 This section similarly contains no
analysis of the child's best interests and no statute of limitations. Georgia thus
189. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54(a) (2002). Specifically,
In any action in which a male is required to pay child support as the father of the child, a
motion to set aside a determination of paternity may be made at any time upon the grounds
set forth in this Code section. Any such motion shall be filed in the superior court and shall
include:
(1) An affidavit executed by the movant that the newly discovered evidence has come
to movant's knowledge since the entry ofjudgment; and
(2) The results from scientifically credible parentage-determination genetic testing ...
and administered within 90 days prior to the filing of such motion, that finds that there
is a zero percent probability that the male ordered to pay such child support is the father
of the child for whom support is required.
Id. (emphasis added).
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54(b) (2004) (emphasis added).
191. § 19-7-54(c).
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provides both mandatory and discretionary relief without any time limitation or
consideration of the child's best interests.
Similarly, the Ohio legislature has enacted Ohio Revised Code sections
3119.961 and 3119.962 that allow a court to grant relief from a paternity
judgment. 92 Rather than relying on the provisions of Rule 60(b), the statute
provides that a court shall grant relief from a paternity and/or child support
order if the man can provide genetic tests which disprove paternity, if he has
not adopted the child, and if the child was not conceived as a result of artificial
insemination. In fact, section 3119.961 specifically provides that,
notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 60(b), the court shall vacate the
192. OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. § 3119.961 (Anderson 2002). Section 3119.962 of the Code
provides:
(A)(1) Upon the filing of a motion for relief under section 3119.961 of the Revised Code, a
court shall grant relief from a final judgment, court order, or administrative determination or
order that determines that a person or male minor is the father of a child or from a child
support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor if all of the following apply:
(a) The court receives genetic test results from a genetic test administered no
more than six months prior to the filing of the motion for relief that finds that
there is a zero per cent probability that the person or male minor is the father of
the child.
(b) The person or male minor has not adopted the child.
(c) The child was not conceived as a result of artificial insemination ....
(2) A court shall not deny relief from a final judgment, court order, or administrative
determination or order that determines that a person or male minor is the father of a
child or from a child support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor
solely because of the occurrence of any of the following acts if the person or male
minor at the time of or prior to the occurrence of that act did not know that he was not
the natural father of the child:
(a) The person or male minor was required to support the child by a child support
order.
(b) The person or male minor validly signed the child's birth certificate...
(c) The person or male minor was named in an acknowledgment of paternity of
the child that a court entered upon its journal ....
(d) The person or male minor was named in an acknowledgment of paternity of
the child that has become final ....
(e) The person or male minor was presumed to be the natural father of the child
under any of the circumstances listed in section 3111.03 of the Revised Code....
(g) The person or male minor was determined to be the father of the child in a
parentage action under Chapter 3111 of the Revised Code.
(h) The person or male minor otherwise admitted or acknowledged himself to be
the child's natural father.
(B) A court shall not grant relief from a final judgment, court order, or administrative
determination or order that determines that a person or male minor is the father of a child or
from a child support order under which a person or male minor is the obligor if the court
determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person or male minor knew that he
was not the naturalfather of the child before any of the following:
(1) Any act listed in divisions (A)(2)(a) to (d) and (A)(2)(f) of this section occurred.
(2) The person or male minor was presumed to be the natural father of the child under
any of the circumstances listed in divisions (A)(1) to (3) of section 3111.03 of the
Revised Code.
(3) The person or male minor otherwise admitted or acknowledged himself to be the
child's father.
(emphasis added).
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orders.193 Even if the man was required to pay support, held himself out as a
father, signed the birth certificate and so forth, those actions will not bar a
claim for relief under section 3119.962 unless it is proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that he engaged in those actions and knew that he was not
biologically related to the child. Furthermore, section 3119.967 provides that a
party is entitled to relief under section 3119.962 regardless of whether the
judgment, order, or determination from which relief is sought was issued prior
to, on, or after October 27, 2000.194 Thus, the legislature has, in effect,
provided a statutory scheme to circumvent the application of Rule 60(b) and the
principle of res judicata as long as the petitioner can provide genetic evidence
of nonpaternity.
Interestingly, two Ohio courts of appeal have declared these statutes
unconstitutional. In Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, the Ohio Court of Appeals for
the Tenth District held that these statutes violated the separation of powers
doctrine because the legislature essentially dictated to the courts what to do
with paternity judgments "rendered months, years, or even decades earlier"
despite the fact that such statute was in direct conflict with Rule 60(b).' 95 The
court continued:
Such a disregard for the traditional powers of the other branches of
government is especially egregious in the context of parenting and
parentage matters. The legislature has in effect ordered the courts to
enter new judgments taking away the only father a child has ever
known if a DNA test indicates that the father and child are not
genetically linked. Such a legislative mandate overlooks how complex
the parent-child relationship is. A person who has served as a parent
for many years is still in many ways a parent to the child, no matter
whose genes and chromosomes are involved. If this were not so, no
adult could successfully adopt a child and raise the child to adulthood.
The courts are in the best position to look out for the best interests of a
child. The best interests are not automatically served by severing a parent-child




Notwithstanding the provisions to the contrary in Civil Rule 60(B) and in accordance with
this section, a person may file a motion for relief from a final judgment, court order, or
administrative determination or order that determines that the person or a male minor... is
the father of a child ....
(emphasis added).
194. § 3119.967 ("[A] party is entitled to obtain relief under section 3119.962 of the Revised Code
regardless of whether the judgment, order, or determination from which relief is sought was issued prior
to, on, or after October 27, 2000.").
195. 784 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
196. Id. at 752.
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The Sixth District Court of Appeals of Ohio, relying on Van Dusen, has
similarly held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional, contrary to the best
interests of children, and violative of longstanding principle of res judicata. In
Poskarbiewicz v. Poskarbiewicz, an ex-husband sought to vacate a paternity
judgment almost fifteen years after the divorce proceedings. 197 He had
unsuccessfully challenged paternity several times and, after the enactment of
section 3119.962, provided genetic tests that disproved his biological paternity.
The court determined that vacating the judgment would not be in the best
interests of the child and, as noted above, declared the statute unconstitutional.
Like the Van Dusen court, the Poskarbiewicz court focused on the need for
stability in these actions, stating: "While we are mindful of the occasional
situation in which an individual may be ordered to pay support for a genetically
unrelated child, the need for stability and repose in child support and paternity
actions far outweighs the harm of disturbing long-standing court orders."'
98
Some statutes, however, attempt to strike a better balance between the
rights of nonbiological fathers and children. Rather than permitting open-
ended paternity challenges, these statutes incorporate either a short statute of
limitations within the paternity set-aside procedure and/or require courts to use
discretion in reopening paternity and consider the best interests of the child.
For example, Alaska's statute provides that the petitioner must file within
three years of the child's birth or three years from the time that the petitioner
knew or should have known that he might not be the child's biological
father.' 99 Because the statute allows a petitioner to file up to three years after
he knew or should have known of his possible nonpaternity, this statute in effect
provides no substantive limitation on the petitioner's ability to file for paternity
disestablishment during the child's minority. If he does not learn of his
nonpaternity until the child is fifteen, for example, he would still have three
years to file his petition. No best interests of the child standard is included
within the statute; thus, a child could consider a man her father for her entire
minority, just to have that man legally disestablished as her father at her
eighteenth birthday. Therefore, while the statute seemingly includes a short
statute of limitations, it is too open-ended and does not serve to balance the
child's interests, unlike the time limitations included in the UPA and proposed
in this Article.
In contrast, the Minnesota statute contains a strict three-year time limit
after the child's birth in which to challenge paternity if the man was married to
or attempted to marry the child's mother. 200  The three-year statute of
197. 787 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
198. Id. at 690.
199. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.166 (Michie 2002).
200. MINN. STAT. § 257.57(b) (2003). The statute provides that for the purpose of declaring the
nonexistence of the father and child relationship presumed under sections 257.55 (1)(a), (b), or (c), the
action may be brought only within two years after the person bringing the action has reason to believe he
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limitations similarly applies if new genetic testing reveals that the man
previously presumed to be the father is not.20' A shorter statute of
limitations-six months-applies if the man voluntarily acknowledged his
202parentage. The Minnesota statute, however, contains no statute of
limitations for a challenge to paternity if paternity is presumed based upon the
man having received the child into his home and openly holding the child out
as his own. 20 3 By not permitting too many open-ended challenges to paternity,
this statute strikes a better balance for children, but is still deficient concerning
the presumption of openly holding oneself out as the child's father. In such a
circumstance, when a child has developed an emotional attachment and
reliance on her father, permitting the father to challenge his paternity at any
time without any consideration of the child's best interests could be
devastating.
None of the statutes discussed above provide satisfactory protection for a
child's best interests. The statutes either fail to include a reasonable statute of
limitations, thereby permitting a father to challenge paternity at almost any time
until the child's majority, and/or omit the requirement that courts consider a
child's best interests. Legislatures must place children's best interests as the
paramount concern in the patemity fraud struggle and limit the means by which
paternity can be disestablished.
V. A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE PATERNITY FRAUD CLAIMS
Current case law and statutes that permit paternity fraud actions often do
not consider the best interests of the child. The legal trend of permitting
paternity disestablishment is at odds with the trend of recognizing the legal
rights of nonbiological parents who have actively cultivated parent-child
relationships with their children. The trend toward recognition of functional
is not the father, "but in no event later than three years after the child's birth." Id. Section 257.55(1)
includes presumptions of paternity that arise:
(a) if the father and mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born
during the marriage or within 280 days after the marriage is terminated; (b) if the father and
mother attempted to marry each other prior to the child's birth and the child is born during
attempted marriage or within 280 days of the attempted marriage's termination; or (c) after
the child birth, the father and mother attempted to marry and although the marriage is invalid,
the father has either acknowledged his paternity in writing, with his consent is named as the
father on the child's birth certificate, or he is obligated to support the child under a written
promise or court order. § 257.55(1).
201. § 257.57(2)(3) (providing that for the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and
child relationship presumed under section 257.55(l)(f), the party has three years after obtaining the
results of blood or genetic tests); Id. § 257.55(I)(f) (providing that a man is presumed to be the child's
father if blood or genetic testing establishes a statistical probability of paternity of 99% or greater).
202. § 257.57(2)(2).
203. § 257.57(2)(1) (providing that a party can bring an action at any time to declare the
nonexistence of a father and child relationship that is presumed under Minnesota Statute section
257.55(d), which establishes a father and child relationship while the child is under the age of majoiity if
the man receives the child into his home and openly holds the child out as his biological child).
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parenthood places the best interests of the child at the forefront of the legal
analysis. To preserve a child's right to have an adult remain in her life, courts
now look beyond biology in recognizing the rights of parents by estoppel and
de facto parents. Similarly, the best interests of the child should be paramount
in the paternity fraud context. Even though the scenarios differ, in that the
nonbiological father no longer wishes to have a legal and emotional
relationship with his child, from the child's perspective there may be no
appreciable difference. To the child, both types of individuals are a "parent."
Recognizing, though, that there are circumstances in which the nonbiological
father feels deceived by the fact of his legal parental relationship, I propose a
short statute of limitations during which a man may challenge his paternity.
The statute of limitations should be either 1) two years from the date on
which a presumption of paternity, as defined by the UPA, applies to create a
legal parental relationship 204 or 2) two years from the date on which a legal
paternity judgment is established in the absence of genetic marker or blood
testing. Furthermore, even within the two-year timeframes, a paternity
disestablishment petition should be permitted only if it is in the child's best
205interest.
204. See supra note 54 for the complete text of the Uniform Parentage Act, section 204, as
amended in 2002.
205. Note, too, that the UPA requires courts to consider a child's best interests when considering a
motion for genetic testing. Section 608 of the Act incorporates principles of estoppel and provides
courts with authority to deny motions for genetic testing, even within the two-year time limitations
articulated above, if such testing would not be in the child's best interests. It provides, in part:
(a) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father or to
challenge the paternity of a child having an acknowledged father, the court may deny a
motion seeking an order for genetic testing of the mother, the child, and the presumed father
or acknowledged father if the court determines that:
(1) the conduct of the mother or the presumed or acknowledged father estops that party
from denying parentage; and
(2) it would be inequitable to disprove the father-child relationship between the child
and the presumed or acknowledged father.
(b) In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing under this
section, the court shall consider the best interest of the child....
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608, 9B U.L.A. 26-27 (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). As noted in the
Comment to section 608 of the Act, "In appropriate circumstances, the court may deny genetic testing
and find the presumed or acknowledged father to be the father of the child." § 608 cmt. (2000). The
Comment further notes that, "[b]ecause § 607 places a two-year limitation on challenging the
presumption of parentage, the application of this section should be applied in those meritorious cases in
which the best interest of the child compels the result and the conduct of the mother and presumed or
acknowledged father is clear." Id.
In this way, the UPA blocks any attempts by the nonbiological father to disestablish paternity
if it is harmful to the child's best interests. Furthermore, this UPA provision provides support for a best
interests consideration in the determination of whether to permit a petition for paternity
disestablishment.
When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore
A. Precluding Petitions More than Two Years After a Presumption of
Paternity Applies
Concerning the first portion of my proposed statute of limitations, UPA
section 204 contains several presumptions of paternity, including 1) marriage to
the child's mother and 2) residing with the child and holding himself out as the
child's father.20 6 Under UPA section 607, a presumption of paternity can be
challenged only within two years, except in specific circumstances. 0 7 Because
the presumptions of paternity in UPA section 204 incorporate the marital
presumption of paternity, my proposed statute of limitations would not permit
an ex-husband to challenge paternity, unless he divorced his wife within two
years of the child's birth and then sought to disprove paternity within the same
two-year period. My reason for this strict time limitation is that the ex-husband
has in almost all instances fostered a parent-child relationship with the child
and has thus assumed a functional parental role even in the absence of
biological parenthood.
For example, in both the Godin and Doran cases discussed above, the
father petitioned to disestablish paternity several years after the divorce. In
Godin, Christina was fifteen years old when her father sought to disestablish
paternity; not only had he engaged in a nurturing, functional parent-child
relationship during the first eight years of her life while married to her mother,
he continued to foster the relationship for six years following his divorce.208
Similarly, in Doran, the father did not challenge paternity until several years
after divorce, and he and the court agreed that he had fostered a loving parent-
child relationship with his son, Billy.209 The Godin court did not permit
paternity disestablishment, while the Doran court ruled that the father could
disestablish paternity. Had either court been operating under the framework
proposed above, neither father would have had standing to bring his case, since
both men filed their petitions more than two years after fulfilling the parental
presumption.
Both courts noted the loving, caring relationships the fathers had
established with their respective children. To permit either of these fathers the
opportunity to question their paternity so far into the relationship does not serve
a child's best interests. As one court has noted in the context of a nonbiological
father suing a child's mother for fraud, to allow the father's fraud claim
focus[es] on the burdens of the parent-child relationship, while
ignoring the benefits of the relationship.... Moreover, a... claim that
seeks to recover for the creation of a parent-child relationship has the
206. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(4), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002).
207. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607, 9B U.L.A. 25-26 (Supp. 2002).
208. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 171-179 and accompanying text.
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effect of saying, 'I wish you had never been born' to a child who,
before the revelation of biological fatherhood, was under the
impression that he or she had a father who loved him or her.
210
Permitting a man to disestablish an ongoing parental relationship tells the child
that the father wishes he had never had a relationship with the child and that a
lack of genetic connection takes precedence over the emotional bonds that they
shared.
Similarly, my proposed statute would preclude the petition in Williams.
Even though Williams had less contact with his son than either Godin or Doran,
he did visit with Marcus and held himself out as Marcus's father for several
211years. While the court was concerned with fairness to Mr. Williams, it never
discussed Marcus's best interests. In fact, this case debunks the Jezebel myth
mentioned at the beginning of this Article. The mother in Williams was not
engaged in outright deceit or trickery, but rather, did not know the identity of
the actual biological father. In Williams, recall, the husband was declared the
legal father. Even after he petitioned the court for an order to submit for
genetic testing a man who he thought might be the biological father, that man,
too, was not genetically related to Marcus. Thus, Williams' litigation rendered
Marcus fatherless and without a paternal genetic identity. It is hard to advocate
that this result was in Marcus's best interests.
B. Precluding Petitions More than Two Years after Paternity Establishment
The second part of my proposed statute of limitations would preclude a
legal father from challenging a paternity judgment more than two years after its
entry and would permit the challenge within the two-year time frame only if the
court determined that the challenge was in the child's best interests. Unlike the
first portion of my proposed statute of limitations, which will often operate as a
strict two-year statute of limitations from the time of the child's birth, this
second portion may give the acknowledged or adjudicated father more time
after the child's birth to challenge paternity.
This second part of my proposed statute of limitations will also apply to
nonmarital fathers who sign voluntary acknowledgments of parentage or who
are adjudicated as fathers. These legal proceedings may not occur immediately
following the child's birth. It is possible that the mother and child had no
reliance on the nonmarital father until he was legally adjudicated as such.
Thus, my proposal gives him two years from the time he is legally established
as the child's father to file a petition to disestablish paternity if he realizes
210. Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Neb. 2002) (rejecting former husband's claims against
child's mother for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on wife's
misrepresentation that that husband was the child's biological father).
211. See supra notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
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subsequent to the legal proceeding that he is not the biological father. Note,
however, that if the legal father had lived with the child and held the child out
as his own, a presumption of paternity would apply, and the strict two-year
statute of limitations would be in effect.21 2 Moreover, by incorporating the best
interest of the child standard, a court may still deny a man's petition to
disestablish paternity-even if it is filed within two years from the date of
paternity establishment-if such disestablishment action would not be in the
best interest of the child.213
For example, in In re Paternity of Cheryl, the father voluntarily
acknowledged his paternity (without submitting to genetic marker testing)
214several months after Cheryl's birth. Thus, my proposal would have allowed
him only two years after the entry of the judgment in which to challenge his
paternity. If, for instance, he had not been legally established as Cheryl's father
until one or two years after her birth, he would have had two years from the
date of adjudication to challenge the paternity judgment. The inclusion of a
best interests analysis allows the court to consider the effects a paternity
disestablishment petition will have on the child. The Cheryl court considered
the fact that the father had actively pursued a parent-child relationship with
Cheryl. To sever the legal relationship-even if the father no longer wished to
maintain his emotional bond-would have deprived Cheryl of a legal identity
and legal and financial benefits. The court recognized that severing the
relationship would be devastating to Cheryl.
A two-year time limit, coupled with consideration of the child's best
interests, would have changed the results in Langston v. Rifle and M.A.S. v.
Mississippi Department of Human Services. Recall in Langston, the court
specifically rejected any consideration of the child's best interests and allowed
paternity disestablishment petitions several years following paternity
judgments, despite facts that, as in Cheryl, demonstrated a functional parent-
child relationship. 2 5  If the court had either employed a narrower statute of
limitations or considered the child's best interests, the paternity
disestablishment petitions would have been denied.
C. Limiting Paternity Fraud Challenges: Protecting Children's Best Interests
in a Manner Consistent with Modern Family Law Trends
A two-year period in which to challenge legal fatherhood largely comports
with the two-year statute of limitations to challenge paternity and/or
212. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(5), 9B U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002).
213. See supra note 205 for a discussion of UPA section 608 and the application of the best interest
of the child standard to a court's determination whether to authorize genetic marker testing. A similar
analysis would apply here.
214. See supra notes 118-132 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
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216presumptions of paternity contained within the UPA. Furthermore, the two-
year period is consistent with certain provisions within the ALI Principles for
217establishing a functional relationship with a child. Since functional or
presumed parenthood can be established based upon a two-year period,218 it
would be incongruous to disestablish paternity after an even greater length of
time. Finally, by using a two-year statute of limitations in which to challenge
legal paternity, the rights of a nonbiological father are recognized and
preserved while ensuring that a child is not deprived of a parent after a
significant bond has developed between the parties.
Maintaining the legal parent-child relationship has support from both
judges and scholars. One judge, addressing new reproductive technologies and
its effects on family formations, has argued that estoppel is critical to achieving
what is in the child's best interests, namely, preserving an intact parent-child
relationship. Even though nonbiological fathers may allege that the child's
mother fraudulently misrepresented that he was, in fact, the biological father,
those allegations should have no bearing on the application of estoppel, because
the father has assumed that functional, parental role, regardless of the genetic
connection. Judge Tamilia wrote:
As a matter of law and public policy, this type of fraud is vitiated by
the acknowledgment of paternal responsibility. The variables of
human nature, emotion and relationship are such that it is impossible to
say six or seven years after acceptance, and when the relationship had
soured, what would have been the appellant's reaction had he known
the true identity of the biological father. With the wide range of
activities engaged in today via artificial insemination, in vitro
fertilization, surrogate parentage, and almost inconceivable matches
resulting in children to parents who cannot conceive together, even this
relationship might have been accepted by a husband who desired to
preserve a marriage with a wife who desired to have a child which
appellant could not produce. The state of confusion that exists in
marital and nonmarital relationships in today's society requires that the
fullest protection possible be provided to the children created through
these relationships.219
216. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 307, 308, 607, 9B U.LA. 317, 341 (2000). For the text of each
section, see supra notes 102-104.
217. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. The ALl Principles look both to the time that
the functional parent has lived with or fostered a parental relationship with the child as well as other
factors which are detailed below.
218. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 89, § 2.03(l)(b); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(5), 9B
U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 2002).
219. Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569, 580 (1995) (Tamilia, J., dissenting). The majority determined
that estoppel principles were inapplicable because the mother had misrepresented to ex-husband that he
was child's father and that estoppel does not apply if one party has engaged in fraud; court thus
permitted ex-husband's motion to vacate paternity order post divorce. Id.
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The statute of limitations that I have proposed will provide much more
protection for children than the statutes analyzed in the previous section, by
limiting the time in which a legal father can challenge his paternity and by
requiring courts to consider the child's best interests. Thus, a child who has a
functional parent-child relationship will not be at risk of losing the legal and
financial benefits of that relationship (and, hopefully, too, the emotional
benefits).
D. Improved Paternity Establishment
As discussed throughout this Article, many men are adjudicated legal
fathers after participating in state paternity and child support enforcement
systems. As several courts noted, forcing women to "name names" so that she
can qualify for needed financial assistance may result in the wrong name being
given and an erroneous judgment entered. 220 Greater efforts to serve named
defendants to avoid default judgments would greatly ameliorate the instances of
paternity fraud. Moreover, requiring genetic testing in the paternity context
would further reduce the number of paternity fraud cases. As Professors Cahn
and Carbone suggest, mandatory paternity testing would estop paternity
challenges. 22' And, if someone refuses to submit to testing or voluntarily
chooses to acknowledge paternity despite a genetic test which reveals
nonpatemity, then he should not later be able to bring a paternity challenge.
While this does not assist married men who may not know to question their
wives' fidelity, it would reduce the incidence of paternity fraud. Moreover, as
argued above, the marital context often differs from the paternity context in that
the married nonbiological father has often nurtured a longstanding emotional
and functional relationship with his child.222
CONCLUSION: IF THE GENES DON'T FIT, YOU'RE STILL THE FATHER
Genetic connection is but one of a myriad of elements that define
parentage. More families are being created without two-parent genetic
connections to the child. As we move toward a more comprehensive definition
of family, we should not sever existing family units because of a lack of
biological connection between a parent and child. By so doing, courts ignore
both the best interests of children and the larger social value of including
multiple types of families.
220. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
222. For example, the fathers in Godin and Doran had actively parented their children for fifteen
years and six years, respectively, prior to seeking paternity disestablishment. See supra notes 133 and
171.
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In trying to balance the best interests of fathers and children, however, the
balance seems best struck when a short statute of limitations, coupled with a
best interests analysis requirement, is used. A two-year statute of limitations
from the triggering of a presumption of parenthood or the legal establishment
of paternity by acknowledgment or judgment provides the father with an
opportunity to challenge a paternity judgment, without causing too much
disruption to the child. If the man does not challenge his paternity within two
years of its establishment by presumption of judgment he should not be able to
bring an action to disestablish his paternity years later. Even though it may
seem unfair to the father-that he is "supporting another man's child"-he is,
in fact, supporting his own. Years of functioning as a parent should not be
dismissed as a "favor" to the mother and child. A legal-and often
emotional-parent-child relationship was formed, despite the lack of biological
connection between the father and child. Open-ended paternity challenges are
not fair to children and often do not accurately reflect the parenting role the
father played. Furthermore, open-ended paternity challenges do not accurately
reflect modern family trends and the importance of functional parenthood and
serve as a backlash against functional parenthood. Functioning as a parent
should be held superior to mere biological parenthood.
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